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I. INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
CONTEXTS 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
Since the question of the law governing natural resource devel-
opment agreements between developing countries and international 
corporate investors was raised by Lord McNair in a seminal article, 
in 1957, 1 the literature on the subject has grown tremendously. 2 My 
excuse for adding to this body of literature is that the many changes 
which have occurred in the organic structure of the world com-
munity, as well as in the internal organization of the developing 
countries whose natural resources are the subject of these agree-
ments, have necessitated a review of the premises upon which Lord 
McNair based his conclusions. 
Lord McN air advocated that economic development agree-
ments between foreign investors and developing states, rich in natu-
ral resources but lacking capital or technology, should be governed 
by a system of general principles of law recognized by civilized 
states. This system of law, he asserted, is not to be considered a part 
of public international law stricto sensu, but a separate system of 
law, sharing with public international law "a common source of 
recruitment and inspiration. " 3 He submitted that a consensus in 
line with his thesis was already emerging and that his article pro-
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sity of London; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University; Of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law, 
Member of the Bar of Nigeria. Formerly Lecturer in Law, University of Lagos, Nigeria (1963); 
Lecturer in Law, University of Nigeria (1965); Government Service (1967); Associate Profes-
sor, University of Connecticut (1971), Hofstra Law School (1972). 
1. McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1957). 
2. See generally Anderson & Coulson, The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, 
33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 917 (1958); Kissam & Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property and 
Abrogation of Concession Contracts, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 177 (1960); Ray, Law Governing 
Contracts Between States and Foreign Nationals, 2 INST. PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD 5 
(1960); Schwebel, International Protection of Contractual Agreements, 1959 AM. Soc'Y INT'L 
L. PROC. 266; Wadmond, The Sanctity of Contract Between a Sovereign and a Foreign 
National, 1957 A.B.A. SECTION MIN. & NAT. RESOURCES L. PROC. 177. 
3. McNair, supra note 1, at 6. 
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posed "to take stock of the trend and to indicate the direction which 
in the best public interest it should follow." 4 
Lord McNair considered the following seven factors supportive 
of his thesis: (1) Such agreements have a "foreign element" because 
they are usually made between a government and a foreign corpora-
tion which owes its existence to the laws of a foreign state and 
derives its capital primarily from nationals of that state. (2) They 
are not simple contracts of sale, but involve a long-term commit-
ment to invest large amounts of capital and technology in the devel-
opment of the natural resources of the developing state. (3) They 
often involve the creation of rights which are not purely contractual 
but are more akin to property rights, such as the right to possess and 
exercise considerable authority over large areas of the territory of 
the developing state. (4) Such agreements often vest in the foreign 
corporation "certain rights of an unusual and semi-political charac-
ter," such as freedom from certain taxes and import duties. (5) They 
sometimes involve the diplomatic efforts of the state of the investor. 
(6) The legal systems of the developing contracting state and the 
state of the investor "frequently have very little in common, either 
in content or in the stages of development." (7) The agreements 
frequently provide for arbitration of disputes in a manner that ex-
cludes the national courts of both parties. 5 
Arguably, few of these factors, even in 1957, were important 
enough to justify the removal of these agreements from the purview 
of the legal system of the host country. Whatever importance these 
factors may have commanded in 1957 has been diminished today by 
the profound changes in the world arena which have affected the 
economic and political status of the developing countries. Moreover, 
these countries, individually and collectively, have experienced in-
ternal changes which have affected both their agreements and 
therefore the law applicable to such agreements with foreign corpo-
rate investors. 
When Lord McNair wrote in 1957, many of the present group 
of developing countries, whose natural resources are today the sub-
ject matter of economic development agreements, were still under 
colonial rule or, to some degree, the economic and political influence 
of one developed capital exporting country or another. 6 Real and 
4. Id. at 2. 
5. Id. at 3-4. 
6. This is reflected in the fact that between 1955 and 1976 about 86 countries, mostly 
Asian and African, have joined the United Nations. 
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imagined fears of "gunboat diplomacy," as well as the great eco-
nomic and political powers of the international companies, com-
bined to hold the economic nationalism of these countries in check. 
As a whole, they had not awakened to the importance and the role 
of their natural resources for their own political and economic devel-
opment; if they had, they lacked the political solidarity and muscle 
needed to gain effective control over them. 
The concept of permanent sovereignty of nations over their 
natural resources was first raised in the United Nations in 1952, in 
connection with the movement for economic development and polit-
ical independence by the developing countries.7 Thereafter, it came 
to be viewed as an aspect of human rights.8 In 1958, the United 
Nations General Assembly established the Commission on Perma-
nent Sovereignty Over National Resources and thus laid the founda-
tion for a thorough study of the subject and its full impact on, and 
implications for, foreign investment in the natural resources of the 
developing countries. 9 After three full years of study and debate in 
different bodies of the United Nations system, the General Assem-
bly passed resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962 on Perma-
nent Sovereignty of states Over their Natural Resources. 10 This reso-
1 ution declared that "the right of peoples and nations to permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exer-
7. See Integrated Economic Development and Commercial Agreements, G .A. Res. 523, 
6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952); Right to Exploit Freely Natural 
Wealth and Resources, G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 
(1952). 
8. See Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right of Peoples and 
Nations to Self-determination, G.A. Res. 837, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/2890 (1954); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 
9. Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right of Peoples and 
Nations to Self-determination, G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 27, U.N. Doc. 
A/4090 (1958). 
10. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). The substance of this resolution was first dis-
cussed by the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 3 U.N. Com-
mission on the Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (19th-33d mtgs.), U.N. Docs. 
A/AC.97/SR.19-SR.33 (1961), see Report of the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, 32 U.N. ESCOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 9), U.N. Doc. E/3511 & Add.1 
[A/AC.97/13 & Add.11 (1961); then by the Economic and Social Council in its 32d Session 
(July 4-Aug. 4, 1961), 32 U.N. ESCOR (1177th-1179th, 1181st mtgs.) 172-77, 180-82, 187-89, 
U.N. Docs. E/SR.1177-SR.1179, E/SR.1181 (1961); and then by the Second Committee at its 
798th through 821st, 841st to 842d, 845th to 846th, 848th, 850th to 861st, 864th, 876th, and 
877th meetings (Sept. 19-Dec. 17, 1962), 17 U.N. GAOR, C.2, at 15-165, 270-74, 293-301, 313-
17, 326-409, 430-31, 501, 507, U.N. Docs. A/C.2/SR.798-SR.877 (1962). 
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cised in the interest of their national development. " 11 It also de-
clared that the development and disposition of the natural re-
sources, including the participation of foreign capital and technol-
ogy, should take place in accordance with the rules and conditions 
laid down by the states.12 In cases where foreign capital and technol-
ogy have been invited to participate in the development, the rela-
tionship between the host state and the foreign investor should be 
governed by their agreement, the laws of the state, and interna-
tional law. 13 Such agreements shall be observed in good faith, but 
can be abrogated by expropriation, nationalization, and requisition-
ing if necessary for the national interests of the states concerned, on 
payment of appropriate compensation. 14 Political independ-
ence-which has come to many peoples and lands since the end of 
the Second World War as a result of universal recognition of the 
right of political and economic self-determination-must therefore 
be seen as the most important factor in considering the legal status 
of economic development agreements. 
Other developments in the United Nations system have been 
directed towards strengthening the sovereign independence of the 
developing countries, particularly with regard to the control over 
and disposition of their natural resources. This strengthening of 
control over their natural resources has given rise to the concept of 
the inalienable permanent sovereignty of states over those natural 
resources. Insofar as developing states have based their actions on 
this concept, the ideas of permanent ownership and inalienability 
implied in permanent sovereignty have been of paramount import-
ance to them in organizing and regulating the development of their 
natural resources. 
For our purposes, the impact of this resolution lies in its politi-
cal significance. For the developing countries, it has formed the 
basis of their claim to control their natural resources. It was ob-
served by many delegations in the several forums where the matter 
was discussed that the sovereign right of states over their natural 
resources had never previously been questioned .15 However, its open 
11. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, para. 1, 17 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). 
12. Id. para. 2. 
13. Id. para. 3. 
14. Id. paras. 4, 8. 
15. See Schwebel, The Story of the UN. 's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463 (1963); Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398, 411 (1964). 
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and public declaration by the international community-in an at-
mosphere in which the newly independent developing countries felt 
that past and present practices of colonialism and other forms of 
subjugation had deprived them of their natural resources and 
wealth-was an invitation to them not only to re-establish their 
sovereignty where it was considered lost, but also to affirm it for the 
present and the future through the exercise of full ownership and 
control over those resources. 
In subsequent resolutions on this subject the General Assembly 
has continued to reaffirm the principles enunciated in resolution 
1803 (XVIl) and further to elucidate their dimensions. 16 For exam-
ple, in resolution 2158 (XXI) of November 25, 1966, while recogniz-
ing that foreign investment under proper governmental supervision 
can play an important role in the development of a country's natural 
resources, the General Assembly affirmed that the exploitation of 
natural resources in each country "shall always be conducted in 
accordance with national laws and regulations." 17 This trend, to 
subject natural resources development agreements and disputes 
arising from them entirely to local law and regulations, follows from 
the fact that the reference to international law, a compromise be-
tween the positions of the capital exporting and importing countries 
which had been carefully worked out in resolution 1803 (XVII), has 
been dropped. 18 The principle of nationalization, which is the means 
of safeguarding permanent sovereignty over natural resources, also 
implies that the expropriating state is entitled to determine the 
amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and 
that any disputes which may arise are to be settled in accordance 
with the national legislation of the state. 19 As could be expected, the 
16. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 16) 29, U .N. Doc. N6316 (1966); Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 
G.A. Res . 2386, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 24, U.N. Doc. N7218 (1968); Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970); Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
of Developing Countries and Expansion of Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic 
Development, G.A. Res. 2692, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 63, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970); 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 3016, 27 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 48, U.N. Doc. N8730 (1972); Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc. N9030 
(1973). See also S.C. Res. 330, 28 U.N. SCOR 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973). 
17. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 2158, para. 4, 21 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N . Doc. N6316 (1966). 
18. Id. para. 4; see also Schwebel, supra note 15. 
19. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, para. 3, 28 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc. N9030 (1973). 
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capital exporting countries have rejected this. 
In a more comprehensive formulation of claims, expressed in 
terms of a new international economic order, the developing coun-
tries have again secured international recognition of their right to 
prescribe and apply norms for the development of their natural 
resources. 
In 1972 the Group of 77, a group of developing countries, pro-
posed to the third United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) the drawing up of a "charter of economic duties 
and rights of states."20 This proposal came as a result of the Group's 
conviction that the existing conditions governing international 
trade relations and policies were no longer adequate to secure the 
development objectives of the world economy, and particularly their 
own economies. 21 The proposal noted that the present international 
economic structure and practices have failed to bridge the gap be-
tween the rich and poor nations, and it called for a set of declara-
tions of rights and duties of states, which could be transformed into 
an international document that states could invoke in asserting 
their rights. 22 
This objective was achieved at the Sixth Special Session of the 
United Nations where the General Assembly adopted, by large ma-
jorities, two resolutions: the Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order, 23 and a Program of Action24 for 
its establishment. In the Declaration the members '1s]olemnly 
proclaim[ ed] [their] united determination to work urgently for 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER based 
on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest 
and cooperation among all States."25 Finally, in December 1974, the 
General Assembly in regular session adopted the Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, 26 embodying the program of 
20. 3 UNCTAD, I Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, para. 209, at 35, U.N. Doc. TD/180, Vol. I (1972). See UNCTAD Res. 45, id., Annex I, 
at 58. 
21. Id. at 35. 
22. Id. 
23. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3201, 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
24. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
G.A. Res. 3202, id. at 5. 
25. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3201, preamble, id. at 3. 
26. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (adopted by a roll call vote of 120 to 6, with 10 
6
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action adopted in the Special Session. 
As indicated earlier, the fundamental purpose of the Charter is 
to promote the establishment of a new international economic order 
which will constitute a binding international instrument for a new 
system of economic relations. Its scope is therefore extensive in 
coverage as well as far-reaching in its implications. It affirms and 
further expounds the generalized claims and counterclaims of the 
participants in the process of natural resource development. Article 
2 provides as follows: 
1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent 
sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its 
wealth, natural resources and economic activities. 
2. Each State has the right: 
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment 
within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regu-
lations and in conformity with its national objectives and priorities. 
No State shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to for-
eign investment; 
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational 
corporations within its national jurisdiction and take measures to 
ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and regula-
tions and conform with its economic and social policies. Transna-
tional corporations shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a 
host State. Every State should, with full regard for its sovereign 
rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise of the right set 
forth in this subparagraph; 
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of for-
eign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be 
paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its 
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation 
gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law 
of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and 
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means 
be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means.27 
By emphasizing the authority of the host state's laws and poli-
cies over foreign investment in natural resource development, and 
over disputes arising from such investments, the Charter seeks to 
strengthen the sovereignty of states over their natural resources. 
abstentions, 29 U.N. GAOR (2315th mtg.) 44-45, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974)). 
27. 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 52. 
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Like the many resolutions of the General Assembly subsequent to 
resolution 1803 (XVIl), 28 the Charter leaves out any reference to 
international law with respect to the observance of agreements en-
tered into between states and investors. Further, it confirms that 
the obligation to pay compensation for expropriation and the 
amount of compensation depend solely upon the expropriating 
state's laws and practices. The result, therefore, is to keep agree-
ments between states and foreign investors within the purview of 
that state's law. 
Ae would be expected, the Charter as adopted, like similar 
resolutions, did not meet with the approval of some important 
capital-exporting countries. The United States, West Germany, 
France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, while not opposed to the 
Charter in principle, each expressed dissatisfaction with its failure 
to provide for the observance of agreements in good faith, as well 
as for payment of compensation for expropriated property in accord-
ance with international law. 29 
It is pertinent here to consider the effect of these developments 
with regard to their value in the United Nations system as interna-
tional community prescriptions. The prescriptive value of United 
Nations resolutions has been considered by national and interna-
tional tribunals and scholars. 30 The U .N. Charter provision which 
relegates resolutions of the General Assembly to mere recommenda-
tions31 still forms the basis of the popular view that those resolutions 
cannot have any legal effect, but can at best serve as a moral force. 
However, there is a growing recognition that some specie of General 
Assembly resolutions can constitute the best evidence of a consen-
sus among states, or lack of it, with respect to particular issues of 
international law and policy.32 The importance of this trend arises 
28. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). 
29. See 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR (2229th mtg.) paras. 77-103, 103-115, 172-201, U.N. 
Doc. NPV.2229 (1974); id. (2230th mtg.) paras. 37-55, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2230 (1974); id. 
(2231st mtg.) paras. 29-49, U.N. Doc. NPV.2231 (1974). 
30. E.g., J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 167-71 (6th ed. 1963); 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 79-100 
(1966); Schachter, Scientific Advances and International Law Making, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 423 
(1967). For opinions of the International Court of Justice, see Advisory Opinion on Voting 
Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-
West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. 67, 120-22 (Lauterpacht, J., separate opinion); South West Africa 
Cases, Second Phase, Judgment, [1966] I.C.J. 4, 50-51; id., at 455-56 (Padilla Nervo, J., 
dissenting). For a U.S. court opinion, see Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 10. 
32. See note 30 supra. 
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from the fact that the United Nations is today the most universal 
political organization, and is therefore the most important forum for 
measuring the degree of agreement among states in matters of inter-
national relations. Resolutions adopted by large majorities on im-
portant issues will carry a great deal of weight, especially if the 
majority is mixed. Similarly, resolutions in the form of declarations 
are customarily viewed by states as having both legal and moral 
significance, because they embody the convictions of the General 
Assembly, and, therefore, those of the states represented there, on 
fundamental issues.33 
The resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty of states Over their 
Natural Resources34 and the Charter on Economic Rights and Du-
ties of States35 meet the qualifications of that specie of United Na-
tions resolutions which have legal as well as moral significance. 36 For 
example, resolution 1803 (XVII) was a declaration; it therefore can 
be deemed to represent the convictions of a majority of the member 
states of the United Nations.37 Also, it was passed by a large major-
ity which included both capital importing and capital exporting 
states and has been viewed as a balanced accommodation of the 
conflicting interests of the two groups of countries. 38 In the case of 
the resolution on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, admittedly some of its provisions were opposed by major 
capital exporting countries. However, the importance of the resolu-
tion is not for that reason diminished; each of the objecting capital 
exporting countries supported it in principle.39 In any case, it is 
supported by a sizable majority of states.40 
These developments within the United Nations system, which 
strengthen the ownership and control by the developing countries 
over their natural resources, have been preceded and complemented 
by developments in other international arenas. Such arenas com-
prise the ever-growing number of natural resources producing organ-
izations which have served and continue to serve as the nurseries for 
33. See Schacter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 CoLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4 (1976). 
34. E.g., Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). See note 16 supra. 
35. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974). 
36. See generally Gess, supra note 15, at 408-17; Schacter, supra note 33, at 7-9. 
37. Schwebel, supra note 15, at 469. 
38. See Schwebel, supra note 15. 
39. See generally materials cited note 29 supra. 
40. See note 26 supra. 
9
Onejeme: Natural Resources Agreements
Published by SURFACE, 1977
10 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 5:1 
the formulation and firming of claims by member countries. The 
claims are designed to win and strengthen the mem her countries' 
sovereignty over their natural resources. The success of the Oil Pro-
ducing and Exporting Countries' (OPEC) united front in securing 
member countries' control of their oil resources has no doubt moti-
vated other natural resources producers. 41 The common objective of 
these organizations is to coordinate and unify the policies of mem-
ber countries. Their efforts have largely resulted in changes in the 
patterns of natural resource development agreements between 
themselves and foreign investors.42 
OPEC, the most successful of the producer organizations, pro-
vides the best demonstration of this trend. For example, during its 
Sixteenth Conference in Vienna, June 24-25, 1968, OPEC adopted 
Resolution XVl.90, 43 in which it recommended some principles upon 
which member countries should base their petroleum policy. In 
summary, these principles were, inter alia: 
1. On Mode of Development: that each member country 
should make every effort to develop its own resources; if foreign 
investor participation is desired, the member so desiring shall seek 
to retain the greatest possible measure of participation. New agree-
ments as well as the existing ones shall be open for periodic revision. 
2. On Participation: that each member country should ac-
quire reasonable participation in the ownership of producing com-
panies on the grounds of the principle of changing circumstances. 
3. On Fiscal Guarantees: that each government may at its 
discretion give a guarantee of fiscal stability, but such guarantees 
notwithstanding, the government must initiate renegotiations of the 
financial terms of the agreement whenever a situation arises in 
which the investor is reaping "excessively high net earnings after 
41. The primary producers' associations and their dates of establishment are as follows: 
OPEC (1960), African Groundnut Council (1964), Intergovernmental Council of Copper Ex-
porting Countries (1967), Asian Coconut Community (1968), Pepper Community (no date 
given), Union of Banana Exporting Countries (1974), Association of Natural Rubber Produc-
ing Countries (1974), International Association of Mercury Producers (1974), International 
Bauxite Association (1974), Council of South-East Asia Lumber Producers' Association 
(1975), African Timber Producers (1975), Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries (1975), 
Primary Tungsten Producers' Association (1975), Jute International (in process). 13 U.N. 
MONTHLY CHRONICLE, No. 9, at 28 (Oct. 1976). 
42. See generally Symposium, The Changing Framework of Concession Agreements and 
the Oil Industry, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279 (1974); Symposium, Mining the Resources of 
the Third World: From Concession Agreements to Service Contracts, 1973 AM. Soc'y INT'L 
L. PRoc. 227. 
43. Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries, OPEC Res. XVI. 
90, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1183 (1968). 
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taxes"; that is, "net profits after taxes which are significantly in 
excess, during any twelve-month period, of the level of net earnings 
the reasonable expectation of which would have been sufficient to 
induce the [investor to make the investment initially]." 
4. On Settlement of Disputes: that all disputes arising be-
tween the governments and the investors shall fall exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the competent national courts or the spe-
cialized regional courts, as and when established. 44 
The norms or principles expressed in this resolution and others 
by producer organizations, in addition to the several resolutions in 
the United Nations system, have provided both the legal and politi-
cal basis for the actions of states, developed45 and developing, with 
respect to the development of their natural resources. The result, as 
far as the developing countries are concerned, has been marked 
changes in the economic and legal structure of agreements under 
which foreign investment participates in the development of their 
natural resources. 46 These changes are relevant in considering or 
reconsidering the proper law of economic development agreements. 
Now the rule rather than the exception, these changes pertain to 
various aspects of the agreements. 
The legal characterization of the agreements has changed from 
concession to other forms, such as service contracts, joint ventures, 
work contracts, and so forth. 47 Some writers have expressed the view 
that this change is not as important as it may look, that in substan-
tive rights and obligations the new kinds of agreements do not differ 
from concessions. 48 These writers ignore the most important legal 
and political fact of the change: the affirmation of the state's owner-
ship of its natural resources. Almost all the developing countries 
have established these legal and political facts by comprehensive or 
special legislation pertaining to their natural resources, or by consti-
tutional provisions which provide for state or public ownership of 
natural resources. 49 Even in respect of preexisting concessionary 
44. Id., reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1184-86. 
45. For recent developments in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, see Perma-
nent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Report of the Secretary-General, [29 U.N. 
GAOR] (Sept. 20, 1974) (mimeo only) 12-14, U.N. Doc. A/9716 (1974). This Report is a 
supplement to Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral, [55 U.N. ESCOR] (Oct. 3, 1973) (mimeo only), U.N. Doc. E/5425 & Add. 1. 
46. See generally materials cited note 42 supra. 
4 7. See id; see also Smith & Wells, Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries: Struc-
tures and Substance, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 560 (1975). 
48. See, e.g., Smith & Wells, supra note 47. 
49. H. CATTAN, THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA 84-85 (1967); see, e.g., OPEC Res. XVI. 90, supra note 43. 
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rights, concessionaires have come to accept the retroactive effect of 
such legislation or constitutional provisions. For example, in a re-
cent agreement between five oil-producing countries and the major 
international oil companies, the latter agreed to yield to the coun-
tries twenty-five percent participation in their profits. The compa-
nies also recognized that the unproduced oil reserves in the conces-
sion area were the national assets of the countries and that the 
companies were therefore not entitled to be compensated for the 
oil.so 
Concessions which grant ownership rights to the concessionaire 
are now inconsistent with the right of permanent sovereignty of the 
state. 51 Even if the economic benefits to the parties are the same in 
both concessions and other forms of agreements, the political value 
of the change to the states is important and substantial.52 
The current agreements are shorter in duration and cover much 
smaller territories; moreover, relinquishment by the investor of sub-
stantial portions of the original area covered by the agreements is 
now a common provision. 53 The old form of concessions, which 
granted extensive and absolute ownership rights as well as extensive 
control over a large territory of the granting state, is no longer politi-
cally or economically acceptable to the developing countries. 54 Con-
sequently, agreements such as those considered by Lord McNair are 
rare today. They have been either renegotiated or expropriated by 
developing countries in the exercise of their permanent sovereignty 
over their natural resources.55 
50. The agreement was entered into in New York on October 5, 1972, between Abu 
Dhabi, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the major oil companies. Permanent Sover-
eignty Over Natural Resources, Report of the Secretary-General, [29 U.N. GAOR] (Sept. 
20, 1974) (mimeo only) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9716 (1974). . 
51. See generally Smith & Wells, supra note 47; W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, JOINT 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22 (1971). 
52. The political survival of the governments in many developing countries may depend 
on how well they are deemed to manage the national patrimony. Calling an arrangement a 
"concession" rather than giving it a label indicating state ownership, especially when the laws 
of the state require such a label, would spell the doom of the government. 
53. See H. CATTAN, supra note 49, at 84-85; see also OPEC Res. XVI. 90, supra note 43. 
54. See materials cited note 42 supra. 
55. Nationalization usually follows refusal by the foreign investor to renegotiate old 
agreements. In OPEC Res. XVI. 90, supra note 43, the organization recommended to its 
members, among other things, that agreements with foreign companies should be open to 
renegotiation at predetermined periods on the grounds of changing circumstances. Id., re-
printed in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 1185. OPEC has backed the nationalization of companies 
which refuse to renegotiate or which have failed to reach agreement with particular countries. 
See OPEC Res. XXIV. 135, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1082 (1971). For example, 
OPEC backed Libya when it nationalized certain oil companies after a breakdown of negotia-
12
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The pattern of sharing of financial benefits in natural resource 
development agreements has changed. With respect to petroleum 
and other important natural resources development agreements, the 
producing countries are no longer interested just in collecting taxes 
and royalties; they now seek, and have acquired by agreement or 
unilateral action, equity participation in the operating companies.56 
As to the exemption from certain taxes and dues which Lord 
McNair also considered important, any exemption is now generally 
a part of a carefully worked out financial arrangement with the 
investor .57 
The laws of the developing countries regulating natural re-
sources have been progressively modernized and are now more easily 
ascertainable. One of the alleged problems of applying the law of a 
developing country to an economic development agreement was 
that the legal system of a developing country was too unsophisti-
cated to regulate complex economic agreements, that such legal 
system was often not close in content or stage of development to 
those of the investors.58 Even if this assertion had any validity at one 
time, which is doubtful, given the fact that most of the developing 
countries have at one time or another shared common legal associa-
tion with some sophisticated legal system, the position has changed 
significantly in the last decades as developing countries reform their 
laws and enact new legislation, particularly in the area of their 
natural resources development. 59 
These changes in the internal legal arrangements of developing 
countries for exploiting their natural resources signify their accept-
ance of the now universally acknowledged challenge that social and 
economic development is primarily their responsibility. 60 The 
tions on government participation . OPEC Res. XXV. 159, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 
221 (1973) . 
56. This is the policy declared in OPEC Res . XVI. 90, supra note 43. See note 55 supra. 
See also Smith & Wells, supra note 47. The Report of the Secretary General on Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources shows that as of 1974, the OPEC members have all 
acquired between 55-100% participation in or ownership of their respective oil industries, [29 
U.N. GAOR] (Sept. 20, 1974) (mimeo only) 4, U.N. Doc. N9716. 
57. See H. CATTAN supra note 49, at 63. 
58. McNair, supra note 1, at 3. 
59. See generally The Status of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Re-
sources, 3 Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.97/5 Rev. 2 [E/3511] (1962); Investment Laws and Regulations in Africa, U.N. Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/INR/28/Rev. 2 (1965). 
60. The Charter of Algiers, adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of 77 Developing Coun-
tries, Oct. 24, 1967, U .N. Doc. MM/77 /1/20, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 177, 180 (1968). 
The same sentiment was expressed by many delegations during debates in the Sixth and 
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changes also reflect the countries' belief in the important role that 
natural resources are expected to play in their efforts. 61 President 
Boumediene of Algeria summed up the complexity of the situation 
of the developing countries in his speech at the United Nations 
Sixth Special Session in 1974: 
In reality, in the race now commencing between industrialized coun-
tries, which intend to accumulate maximum profits in order to be 
able to dispense as soon as possible with the raw materials of the 
developing countries and, on the other hand, the developing coun-
tries themselves, which intend to profit from the ultimatum which 
has been clearly served upon them in order to lay the foundations 
of their development and their economic liberation, the problem of 
raw materials can no longer be formulated in purely commercial 
terms. It exhibits all the aspects of a veritable strategic problem 
which will determine the survival of the producing countries and 
must be subjected to the most determined vigilance.62 
The legal and political contexts of modern natural resource 
development agreements which have been surveyed in the preceding 
pages form the background against which the problem of the proper 
legal order of such agreements can be more accurately described. As 
has been indicated, this background has changed many of the fac-
tors that seemed important when Lord McNair first pointed to the 
problem. 
The purpose of this article, therefore, is to examine the current 
trend of agreements for the development of natural resources of the 
developing countries. As Lord McNair had noticed, and in view of 
the current practices of the participants in these agreements, the 
consensus on the proper law points towards the unquestionable and 
comprehensive control of the local laws and regulations of develop-
ing countries. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Every agreement must be concluded within the framework of a 
legal system. No agreement can exist in a vacuum. It is in the 
context of such a legal system that the parties to the agreement 
Seventh Special Sessions of the General Assembly. 
61. See generally Natural &sources of Developing Countries: Investigation, Develop-
ment and Rational Utilization, U.N. Doc. E/4608/Rev. 1, ST/ECA/122 (1970); Mineral &-
sources Development with Particular Reference to the Developing Countries, ST/ECA/ 
123 & Corr. 1 (1970); OPEC Res. XVI. 90, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1183 (1968). 
62. 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR (2208th mtg.) 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2208 (1974). 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1977], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss1/2
1977] Natural Resources Agreements 15 
assume rights and obligations. The legal system provides the norms 
by which genuine differences of opinion about the meaning of the 
terms of the agreement can be resolved. The legal system draws the 
outer boundaries of the relevant community's policies beyond which 
the parties cannot legally go, and within which other matters of 
interest to the community must be resolved, such as the capacity 
of the parties, validity, performance, termination, and remedies. In 
private contracts having international connections with more than 
one jurisdiction, the proper determination of the relevant legal sys-
tem is achieved by the application of the forum state's relevant 
prescriptions and policies. The purpose of such determination is to 
select, from among interested jurisdictions, one whose dominant 
interest justifies the application of its substantive rules for the reso-
lution of the conflict which has arisen. With few exceptions, 63 the 
general practice among states is to give the greatest weight to the 
express or implied will of the parties.64 In the absence of an express 
provision by the parties, common practice is to resort to certain 
presumptions as guides to determining the proper law of the agree-
ment, for example, the law of the place where the agreement is made 
(lex loci contractus) or where it is to be performed (lex loci solu-
tionis) .65 Where such presumptions are dispelled by other considera-
tions, such as the subject matter of the contract, the nature of the 
parties, and so forth, the proper law is the law which the parties are 
deemed by the forum decision-maker to have intended. 
The question which is posed by agreements between a develop-
ing country and a foreign investor for the development of that coun-
try's natural resources is whether the proper legal system to govern 
such agreements should be determined by the procedures and prac-
tices which have been described above. The answer to this question 
will depend on whether the purposes for such inquiry are the same 
as for private contracts having international connections. It is sub-
mitted that the purposes are not the same. A contract between a 
state and a private party has two aspects: the state is a contracting 
party as well as a sovereign. By common practice of states, a con-
tractor is deemed to contract under its own law, and its rights and 
obligations are determined under that law. 66 As a sovereign having 
63. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 188 (1971). 
64. J. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 721-48 (9th ed. 1973). 
65. Id. at 742-46; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 188(2)-(3); see also 
id. §§ 189, 196, 205-206. 
66. See Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, 
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control and authority over people and events within its jurisdiction, 
as well as having total responsibility for the well-being of its body 
politic, a state can make sovereign decisions and take sovereign 
actions within its jurisdiction which may unilaterally change the 
expectations freely created by its agreement with the private party. 
Such unilateral action may involve issues of whether the state has 
negotiated away its sovereign rights in the agreement. To this ex-
tent, the question is one of interpretation, subject to a presumption 
in favor of the state's sovereign power of action. 
Unless the unilateral action of the state is alleged to be a breach 
of some international obligation or to be contrary to any rules of 
international law, including the general principles of law in the 
sense of article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, a dispute arising therefrom cannot be resolved by any legal 
system other than that of the state. When a state's unilateral action 
is challenged, a question arises as to which international obligation 
or international law has been violated. The inquiry is directed to-
wards ascertaining international norms by which to evaluate the 
state's action in reference to its responsibility under international 
law. Such responsibility arises from the fact that the state is a 
sovereign having duties and obligations under international law. If 
asked in that context, the question does not focus on the "proper 
law" of the agreement which the state has unilaterally breached in 
the exercise of its sovereign powers. The true issue of the "proper 
law" of the agreement between a state and a foreign investor can 
properly arise only in the context of the state's actions as a contrac-
tor. The proper international norms governing the responsibility of 
the state for a breach of international law or obligation has nothing 
to do with the proper law of the agreement between the state and a 
foreign investor unless, of course, the agreement is concluded under 
international law. 
Many scholarly discussions dealing with the "proper law" to 
apply in economic development agreements confuse the distinction 
between disputes which raise the issue of the proper law of the 
agreement only and those which raise issues of state responsibility 
under international law. They concentrate on the latter, where ten-
sions run high and clarification of issues becomes clouded with pas-
sion. It must be remembered that many contractual investment 
[19291 P.C.I.J ., ser. A, No. 20, at 42; Case Concerning Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in 
France, [1929] P .C.I.J ., ser. A, No. 21, at 121. 
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disputes involve legitimate and honest differences of opinion in 
which the parties' efforts to find a solution are marked by friendly 
and sincere search for a reasonable understanding. 87 
For reasons which have become obvious, the search for the 
proper law of economic development agreements between private 
entities must be more limited than in cases of agreements having 
international connections. General principles of conflict of laws 
common in the practices of states may help in the search for agree-
ments having international connections but cannot be controlling. 88 
The search for the proper law of agreements between states and 
private entities, especially when the solution is to be arrived at by 
implication, must be limited to a choice between the legal order of 
the contracting state and international law. 89 In no case known to 
this writer has another state made a claim to regulate such con-
tracts. In fact, such a claim would be deemed objectionable on the 
grounds of the sovereign immunity of states.70 This is not, of course, 
to say that states may never conclude agreements with private enti-
ties or other states which call for the application of another state's 
law.71 Where there exists an express agreement of the state there is 
no doctrinal or other reason for objection. A state may, in the exer-
cise of its sovereign authority, conclude such contracts. In such 
cases, common interest in freedom of contract compels the fullest 
recognition of the parties' autonomy unless such a result is prohib-
ited by a state's fundamental policies72 or in some way offends some 
international community policy. 73 
67. See, e.g., Petroleum Dev. [Trucial Coast] Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 
144 (1951), 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 247 (1952); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (AR-
AMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117 (1958); Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 
I.L.R. 136 (1963). In the ARAMCO arbitration, the friendly nature of the parties was evi-
denced in their memorials: 
As shown by the memorials and oral arguments of both Parties, the present 
arbitration is a friendly one, whose purpose is to decide what is just and right in the 
dispute which has arisen between the Parties, so that they may resume and maintain 
the friendly and fruitful co-operation which has characterized their relations for 
nearly a quarter of a century. 
27 I.L.R. at 135. 
68. McNair, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
69. Id. at 10; see Broches, Choice-Of-Law Provisions In Contracts With Governments, 
in PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: CHOICE OF 
LAW AND LANGUAGE 64, 73 (1962); Delaume, The Proper Law of Loans Concluded by Interna-
tional Persons: A Restatement and a Forecast, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 68 (1962). 
70. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. at 155-56. 
71. See, e.g., Mann, Another Agreement between States under National Law?, 68 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 490 (1974) (bilateral agreements governed by the domestic law of one state). 
72. Such as a Calvo Clause or similar provision in the state's constitution. See note 85 
infra. 
73. E.g., Jus Cogens. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969 
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Where there is a clear expression of intention in the agreement, 
no problem arises. It is when the agreement is either silent on the 
applicable law or makes only vague references about applicable law 
that opinions among scholars and decisionmakers diverge. 
There is a misleading undercurrent influencing the discussions 
of the problem, especially by Western scholars. This undercurrent 
consists of an overemphasis of the need to protect the foreign inves-
tor. It is misleading because the assertions about the implied proper 
law of the contracts under consideration do not take a community 
view of the world. In the long run, this attitude may well injure the 
investor rather than protect him. The bases for the assertions by 
these scholars are wide-ranging. For instance, it is widely assumed 
that the decisionmakers of most grantor states are unsophisticated 
and cannot understand, much less determine, the complex issues 
involved in a modern economic development agreement. It is also 
claimed that, even if they have such sophistication, they are likely 
to be prejudiced against the foreign investors. It is further claimed 
that the laws of most developing countries are undeveloped to such 
an extent that those laws cannot provide rules for a proper interpre-
tation of a complex modern economic development agreement. 74 
One writer has actually suggested that Moslem law, which is the law 
of a significant part of the world, because it is technically addressed 
to Moslems75 is incapable of general application and therefore can-
not be appropriate to regulate rights and obligations under a mod-
ern economic development agreement between a Moslem state and 
a non-Moslem foreign investor. 
Other expressions of concern for the foreign investor who is 
subject to the local authority of the contracting state allude to the 
improbability of the employment of gun-boat diplomacy to secure 
performance of contractual obligations by the developing states and 
suggest that this affords a reason to seek protection of the investor 
in other ways. As was pointed out by a recent Wall Street Journal 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1971) (ratified by 26 nations as of July 1976-needs 35 ratifications 
to take effect). 
74. See generally McNair, supra note 1, at 4; Broches, The Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES Couas 
(Hague Academy of International Law) 330, 387-95 (1972). 
75. Anderson & Coulson, supra note 2, at 922. But see Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 27 l.L.R. at 162-65 (the tribunal found that Moslem law permitted the Imam, as the 
theocratic Ruler, to grant concessions to any investor in accordance with the Shari'ah). 
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editorial, "[i]n the 19th Century . . . 'cutting out expeditions' 
were almost routinely conducted against petty gangster govern-
ments. " 76 When such expeditions were the accepted proper re-
sponse, it is implied, the foreign investor had no concern that the 
local legal system would not adequately protect him, for his govern-
ment stood behind him. Now that this form of protection is improb-
able, 77 some suggest, as an alternative, the elevation of the agree-
ments under consideration to the plane of international law whereby 
the contracting state can incur direct international responsibility for 
the mere breach of such agreements. 
III. ASSERTIONS ABOUT APPLICABLE LAW IN CONCRETE 
SITUATIONS 
A. Agreements Containing Specific References to the Applicable 
Law 
Many modern natural resource development agreements con-
tain provisions for dispute settlement which may or may not include 
specific reference to the law to be applied. The provisions appear in 
a number of forms which vary in accordance with the perceptions 
of the parties about one another's good faith, as well as the degree 
to which they are anxious to do business with one another. 78 The 
location of the natural resource and the nationality of the investors 
may also be important. In the final analysis, it is the ingenuity of 
the negotiators that counts. 
In most cases it is the investor who is anxious to include a 
specific provision in the agreement. There are various reasons for 
this: the investor may need to be assured in advance that reasonable 
rules will be applied in interpreting the agreement and in determin-
ing the rights and obligations of the parties; he may also simply 
76. Flying High and Low, Wall St. J., July 7, 1976, at 14, col. 1. Although the statement 
was made in quite a different context-the Israeli commando raid at Entebbe-most of the 
"expeditions" referred to were conducted for less humanitarian purposes. 
77. This would seem to be so as a result of the prohibitions of such actions under the 
U.N. Charter. Referring to this prohibition in connection with the British and Iranian dispute 
over the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Dean Acheson said, "In simpler 
times and places armed intervention, known as 'gunboat diplomacy,' would have resolved this 
problem in favor of the stronger power, but the United Nations Charter put obstacles, to say 
the least, in the way of that." D. ACHESON, PRESENT ATTHE CREATION-MY YEARS AT THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT 505 (1969). 
78. Lord McNair observed that, "[o]ne can truly infer from these contracts-both from 
what they do say and from what they do not say-that the parties are groping after some 
legal system which is not the territorial law of either party." McNair, supra note 1, at 10. 
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want to "create an enclave status"79 for the agreement and thus 
protect himself from future changes in the laws of the state. A recent 
study has indicated that this last reason dominates in recent re-
source development agreements between foreign investors and de-
veloping countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations.80 Some 
practicing lawyers have pointed to the usual difficulties of negotiat-
ing dispute settlement provisions in modern agreements, particu-
larly with developing countries. They point to the fact that it is 
"troublesome [for them] to jusitfy provisions in an agreement 
which in effect exempt an investor from the operation of local law 
or [which] apply another law."81 In those countries where laws 
prohibit submission of government agreements with foreign inves-
tors to any law other than their own, refusal to agree to a dispute 
settlement provision is not just a matter of reluctance or inconveni-
ence, but of legal impossibility. 82 
Despite these difficulties, such provisions are inevitable in 
modern resource development agreements. Happily, the dilemma of 
a state which will not be able to attract the necessary foreign capital 
and know-how for the development of its natural resources unless 
it is willing to agree to a provision for the applicable law, has now 
been made less serious by the existence of the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington, 
D.C., established under the Convention on the Settlement oflnvest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.83 
The most common forms of provision for the applicable law in 
modern economic development agreements may be generally classi-
fied as follows: 
1. Those directing the application of the local law of the con-
tracting state alone. 
2. Those directing the application of principles of law com-
79. Brown, Choice of Law Provisions in Concession and Related Contracts, 39 Moo. L. 
REV. 625 (1976). 
80. See id. 
81. Lipton, Negotiating a Concession Agreement: From the Host Government Point of 
View, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN BLACK AFRICA 78, 78 (1975); see 
Walcott, Corporate Objectives for Developing Mineral Properties in Africa, in id. at 85, 88. 
82. See notes 84-94 infra and accompanying text. 
83. Done March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.l.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (opened 
for signature Aug. 27, 1965; entered into force (U.S.) Oct. 14, 1966); see Vuylsteke, Foreign 
Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343 (1974). See 
generally Lipton, supra note 72; Walcott, supra note 72. As of June 30, 1973, about 68 states 
had signed the Convention, and 65 of them had ratified it, see [1972/1973] ICSID, 7TH ANN. 
REP. 
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mon between the contracting state and the state or states of the 
investors. 
3. Those directing the application of the law of the contract-
ing state to one part of the agreement and international law to other 
parts. 
4. Those directing the application of international law alone. 
1. PROVISIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAW 
As was previously stated, most producing grantor states now 
have comprehensive legislation relating to the exploitation of their 
natural resources-84 They naturally intend that the policies they 
have expressed in such legislation, as well as in their general laws, 
should govern all agreements with private individuals and entities 
for the exploitation of their resources. Some developing countries 
have a definite policy which provides that an alien who is doing 
business within their jurisdictions must be subjected to the same 
laws as a national. These countries specifically prohibit the possibil-
ity of any choice of law in agreements with aliens. They do this 
through provisions in their constitutions or through their general 
laws. Examples of such prohibitions abound in the constitutions 
and laws of the Latin American countries where the so-called Calvo 
Doctrine has been generally accepted and faithfully followed. 85 
Outside Latin America, there is a growing tendency among the 
developing countries to prohibit the possibility of a choice of law 
84. See generally The Status of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Re-
sources, 3 Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 
97 /5/Rev. 2 [E/3511] (1962); Investment Laws and Regulations in Africa, U .N. Economic 
Commission for Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/INR/28/Rev. 2 (1965). 
85. Named after its architect, the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo (1824-1906), the doctrine 
asserts that a foreigner doing business in another country is entitled to nondiscriminatory 
treatment only; and that by entering the country, he impliedly consents to be treated as a 
national of that country. The clause requires him to renounce his right to call on his own 
government for diplomatic protection. See generally D. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE (1955). The 
attachment to the Calvo Clause by Latin American countries is so strong that they have 
collectively refused to sign the World Bank Group's Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, supra note 83. As to the reasons 
for their refusal, see Wionczek, A Latin American View, in How LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE 
U.S. INVESTOR 4 (1966). More recently, the Andean Pact nations-Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela-declared in Commission Decision 24 that "[n]o instrument 
concerning foreign investments or transfer of techniques shall include clauses which withdraw 
possible differences of controversies from the national jurisdiction of the recipient country, 
or which permit subrogation by the governments of the shares or rights of their national 
investors." Standard Regime for Treatment of Foreign Capitals [sic] and for Treatment of 
Marks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, Andean Comm'n Dec. 24, art. 51 (1970), reprinted 
in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 152, 166 (1971) (unofficial translation). 
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clause in economic development agreements. 116 This tendency is gen-
erated by the determination of those countries to reject any express 
or implied suggestion that their legal systems are inferior to any 
other. When foreign investors enter into investment agreements 
with the governments of developed countries, it is assumed that the 
legal systems of the developed countries govern the agreement. 87 
Why, the developing countries argue, should it be any different with 
agreements with them? 
The methods by which these countries try to exclude the possi-
bility of a choice of law in contracts with foreign investors consist 
of either requiring a national organization of the foreign business 
enterprise (for example, partnerships or corporations) or stating 
expressly that the national legal order will govern all disputes. The 
practice of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in granting oil explora-
tion and prospecting licenses and mining leases, illustrates both 
methods. The earlier oil licenses and leases provided for arbitration 
of disputes (except over those matters expressly excluded or said to 
be at the discretion of the Minister or Commissioner) and stated 
that the lease or license "shall be governed and construed in accord-
ance with the laws of Nigeria and Nigerian law shall be the proper 
law hereof." 88 Since 1968, all foreign enterprises, whether estab-
lished in Nigeria before or after 1968, are required to be incorporated 
under Nigerian law. 89 This requirement makes all foreign enter-
prises, in Nigeria, Nigerian nationals subject of course to Nigerian 
laws. The Nigerian Petroleum Decree, 1969, which regulates the oil 
industry, vests in Nigeria ownership and control of all petroleum 
and provides that licenses or leases to explore, prospect, and mine 
petroleum "may be granted only to-(a) a citizen of Nigeria, or (b) 
a company incorporated in Nigeria under the Companies Decree 
1968 or any corresponding law."90 Since only Nigerians can engage 
in the petroleum industry, it follows that there can be no possibility 
86. For the practices of the Black African countries, see Lipton, supra note 81. See also 
Smith & Wells, supra note 47. 
87. OECD, THE EXPLORATION FOR AND EXPLOITATION OF CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN 
THE OECD AREA INCLUDING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF; MINING AND FISCAL LEGISLATION 16 (1973). 
88. Article 60 of the Standard Mining Lease. 
89. Companies Decree, No. 51, of 1968, S. 369. See generally M. ADESANYA & E. OLOYEDE, 
BUSINESS LAW IN NIGERIA 227-48 (1972). For examples from other countries, see The Status of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, U.N. Doc. A/AC.97/5 Rev. 2 
[E/3511] (1959); Report of the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources, U.N. Doc. A/AC.97/13 (1959). 
90. Petroleum Decree of 1969, Ss. 2(2)(a)-2(2)(b). 
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for a choice of law clause in oil agreements. Moreover, Schedule I 
to the Decree, which deals with the nature and form of licenses and 
leases, provides in article 41 that any disputes shall be settled by 
arbitration unless such disputes are expressly excluded or stated to 
be at the discretion of the Commissioner. The Decree then provides 
that all such arbitrable disputes "shall be settled in accordance with 
the law relating to arbitration in the appropriate state and the pro-
vision shall be treated as a submission to arbitration for purposes 
of that law. " 91 
The insistence of the developing countries on the application of 
their own laws to agreements with foreign investors has been largely 
motivated by the directives of the many natural resources producer 
organizations. For example, the OPEC guidelines for petroleum pol-
icy in member countries direct that: 
Except as otherwise provided for in the legal system of a Member 
Country, all disputes arising between the Government and operators 
shall fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent na-
tional courts or the specialized regional courts, as and when estab-
lished.112 
Another example is Decision 24 of the Andean Commission, 93 made 
December 31, 1970, according to which foreign investment agree-
ments by member countries shall not include clauses which 
"withdraw possible differences or controversies from the national 
jurisdiction of the recipient country. " 94 Since 1966, the several 
United Nations resolutions on permanent sovereignty of states over 
their natural resources, emphasizing the exclusive jurisdiction of 
local law, have also been influential in encouraging the developing 
countries to insist that all their agreements with private foreign 
investors be governed by local law. 
91. Id. S. 10(1). 
92. OPEC Res. XVI. 90, supra note 43, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1186 (1968). 
93. Andean Comm'n Dec . 24, supra note 85, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 152 
(1971). The Commission was established by the Agreement on Andean Subregional Integra-
tion [Cartagena Agreement], May 26, 1969, ch. II, § A, arts. 6-12, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'Ls 910, 911-13 (1969). See generally Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the 
Foreign Investment Process: A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 319 
(1975). 
94. Andean Comm'n Dec. 24, supra note 85, art. 51 , reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 
at 166. 
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2. PROVISIONS DIRECTING THE APPLICATION OF LAW COMMON TO THE 
CONTRACTING STATE AND THE STATE OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR 
As has already been indicated, one of the reasons for the sugges-
tion that economic development agreements with foreign investors 
should be governed by some law other than the law of either the 
contracting state or the state of the foreign investor is that the 
parties do not know or understand the laws of one another's jurisdic-
tion. As a technique of achieving equanimity between the parties, 
a provision directing the application of rules and principles of law 
common to all the parties, and requiring the filling of any gaps with 
principles of international law including the general principles of 
law referred to in article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, has been adopted in some agreements. 
A good illustration of this kind of provision is to be found in 
article 46 of the 1954 Consortium Agreement between Iran and a 
group of foreign companies. This Agreement provides, in part: 
In view of the diverse nationalities of the parties to this Agreement 
it shall be governed by and interpreted and applied in accordance 
with the principles of law common to Iran and the several nations 
in which the other parties to this Agreement are incorporated, and 
in the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance 
with principles ... as may have been applied by international 
tribunals. 95 
There are variations of this kind of formulation of the applica-
ble law. Their design is said to be to strengthen confidence and a 
sense of security in the foreign investor by assuring him that dis-
putes arising from the operation of the contract will be resolved by 
application of reasonable rules. The actual formulation will depend 
on the condition of the parties and the strength of their desire to do 
business with one another, whether such desire was generated by 
enthusiasm or hardship. 911 
Some have argued that provisions such as these are indicative 
95. Consortium Agreement (lran-NIOC) of 1954, art. 46, quoted in Sapphire Int'l Petro-
leums, Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 174 (1967); McNair, supra note 1, at 
8-9 (emphasis added). See generally Farmanfarma, The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the 
International Oil Consortium: The Law Controlling, 34 TEx. L. REV. 259, 269-74 (1956). 
96. In the Sapphire Int'l Petroleums arbitration, it was suggested that the wording of 
article 46 of the 1954 Consortium Agreement between Iran and the Companies was discussed 
extensively, and that the agreement on the form wae influenced by the difficulties being 
experienced by the Iranian Treasury. Oil production had stopped because of the dispute 
arising from the expropriation law of 1951, and Iran felt the need to "put an end to a situation 
which was likely to become rapidly worse." 35 I.L.R. at 174. 
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of the parties' intention to apply international law to the exclusion 
of the law of the grantor state. 97 This would not appear to be the case 
from a careful reading of the provision. International law, which 
must be said to include not only the rules and principles of inter-
state law but also worldwide practices in the particular industry, is 
not utilized until it has become evident that the law of the grantor 
state is inadequate to settle the controversy in question. The inten-
tion to exclude the legal order of the grantor state cannot be read 
into such a provision. To do so would defeat the genuine function 
which the permissible resort to the principles of international law 
is designed to perform, namely, to provide rules in aid of fair inter-
pretation of the agreement and, in the case of adverse state action 
involving a breach of international obligation, to provide the stan-
dards for evaluating the state action. Resort to international law, 
therefore, is only to supplement local law in the resolution of the 
dispute. 
This seems to be the principle behind the provision for applica-
ble law in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States. Article 42 of this 
Convention provides that: 
(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such 
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such 
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict oflaws) 
and such rules of international law as may be applicable. 911 
A fair interpretation of this provision would include the view that 
it requires, in the absence of express provision otherwise, that pri-
mary resort be to local law of the contracting state, and secondary 
resort be to rules of international law, if such rules aid interpretation 
and application of the agreement. International law, therefore, is to 
complement the local law and not to supplant it. 
3. PROVISIONS DIRECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACTING 
STATES' LAW TO ONE ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW TO OTHERS 
As in the case just considered, in order to accommodate each 
97. See McNair, supra note 1, at 3-4; Kissam & Leach, supra note 2, at 198; Ray, supra 
note 2, at 10; Broches, supra note 69. 
98. Convention on the Settlement oflnvestment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States, March 18, 1965, art. 42(1), 17 U.S.T. 1286, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 
159. 
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other, the parties may include choice of law clauses in their agree-
ment whereby the subject matter of disputes is divided into two or 
more aspects, each to be governed by a different legal order. A 
classic example of this form is provided by an arbitration agreement 
between the government of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American 
Oil Company (ARAMCO) in 1955. Article IV of that agreement 
provides: 
The Arbitration Tribunal shall decide this dispute 
(a) in accordance with Saudi Arabian law, as hereinafter de-
fined, in so far as matters within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia 
are concerned; 
(b) in accordance with the law deemed by the arbitration tri-
bunal to be applicable in so far as matters beyond the jurisdiction 
of Saudi Arabia are concerned.99 
The reference to Saudi Arabian law was to the Moslem law as 
taught by the school of Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal and as applied in 
Saudi Arabia. 
This provision received extensive consideration by the tribunal 
set up under the arbitration agreement. In order to understand the 
effect which the tribunal gave to the provision, it will be necessary 
to give some background of the dispute which led to the 1955 agree-
ment. 
Saudi Arabia, in 1933, entered into a concession agreement 
with ARAMC0 100 by which ARAMCO was granted, inter alia, "the 
exclusive right, for a period of 60 years . . . to explore, prospect, 
drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry 
away and export petroleum, asphalt, naphtha, natural greases, ozo-
kerite and other hydrocarbons, and the derivatives of all such prod-
ucts."1111 In 1954, Saudi Arabia entered into a contract with Aristotle 
Onassis, by which Onassis was given permission to form a private 
company, Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Company Ltd. 
(SATCO), which was granted the "right of priority for the transport 
of oil" from Saudi Arabian ports to foreign markets. 102 The govern-
ment then required ARAMCO to give SATCO priority for transport-
99. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117, 231 (1958). For the 
entire text of the Arbitration Agreement, see id. at 229-33. 
100. The original agreement was with the Standard Oil Company of California, which 
assigned it to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company. The latter changed its name to 
the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO. Id. at 117-18. 
101. Id. at 175. 
102. Id. at 127-28. 
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ing Saudi Arabian petroleum to foreign countries. ARAMCO 
claimed that the Onassis agreement was inconsistent with the rights 
granted to it under the 1933 concession agreement. A difference of 
opinion therefore arose between the parties, and it was to resolve 
this difference that the arbitration agreement was concluded. 
The arbitration agreement made clear that the government was 
not attempting to exercise any sovereign rights in derogation of the 
1933 concession agreement. 103 In the view of the parties, the only 
issue was the interpretation of the 1933 concession agreement and 
the determination of the consistency of the Onassis agreement with 
the rights granted to ARAMCO under the concession agreement. 
The tribunal, therefore, was simply to make a declaration of the 
rights of the parties. 
The tribunal's first task was to delineate matters which fell 
within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia and, therefore, to be regu-
lated by Saudi Arabian law, and those which fell outside that juris-
diction. In the case of the latter, the tribunal was directed by article 
IV(b) of the agreement to apply the law it deemed applicable. In 
determining matters within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, the 
tribunal first noted that a contract or concession agreement cannot 
exist in a vacuum. The tribunal stated: 
It is obvious that no contract can exist in vacuo, i.e., without 
being based on a legal system. The conclusion of a contract is not 
left to the unfettered discretion of the Parties. It is necessarily re-
lated to some positive law which gives legal effects to the reciprocal 
and the concordant manifestations of intent made by the parties. 
The contract cannot even be conceived without a system of law 
under which it is created. Human will can only create a contractual 
relationship if the applicable system of law has first recognized its 
power to do so. 104 
The tribunal then stated its belief that the appropriate governing 
law of a concession agreement should coincide with the economic 
103. The sixth "Whereas" clause of the arbitration agreement stated: 
WHEREAS the Government and Aramco state that (1) they respect all obliga-
tions which they have undertaken and now undertake, (2) the Government and 
Aramco have never entertained the thought that they would not be bound by the 
agreements they have made and now make with one another, and (3) agree that 
neither the agreement on the part of the Government and Aramco to arbitrate the 
dispute herein pursuant to Article 31 of the Aramco Concession Agreement nor the 
arbitration itself includes or involves the right of sovereignty of the Government 
Id. at 230. See id. at 149-53. 
104. Id. at 165 (footnote omitted). 
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milieu in which the operation is to be carried out, that is, the law 
of the country with which the agreement "has the closest natural 
and effective connection." 105 It stated that the selection of this legal 
order is to be guided by principles of private international law ac-
cording to which the express choice of the parties must be given 
paramount consideration. Failing such expression of the will, the 
tribunal was to be guided by general principles of private interna-
tional law. 
The tribunal then concluded that matters within the purview 
of the agreement had the closest natural and effective connection 
with Saudi Arabia, pointing out that the concession agreement it-
self, its operation, and its interpretation belonged to the jurisdiction 
of Saudi Arabia: the agreement was signed in Jeddah, Saudi Ara-
bia; it was for the most part to be performed in Saudia Arabia; "its 
performance entail[ ed] the exploitation . . . of the hidden wealth 
of the subsoil of Saudi Arabia and the creation of proprietary rights 
in immovables situated in the territory of that State. " 106 Further, 
Saudi Arabia, the grantor, was a sovereign state and was presumed 
to have subjected its contracts with private individuals to its own 
legal order .107 For these reasons, the tribunal found that the Saudi 
Arabian legal order was the basic governing law of the concession 
agreement. 108 
The question of the inadequacy of Saudi Arabian law to regu-
late a complex concession agreement was then raised by ARAMCO. 
It argued that because the Hanbali school of Moslem law, the law 
of Saudi Arabia, was not sufficiently developed to regulate petro-
leum exploitation operations, the concession agreement "must be 
'delocalized' and assimilated to an international treaty, governed by 
the Law of Nations," including the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized states. 109 The tribunal had no difficulty in dismiss-
ing this argument, noting that "Saudi Arabia belongs to one of the 
great legal systems of the world" 110 and shares with other major 
105. Id. at 167. 
106. Id. at 166-67. 
107. Id. at 167. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 162. 
110. Id. The tribunal explained that Moslem Law has many schools or rites which are 
fundamentally the same, but which diverge with respect to certain details. "The principle 
Sunni Schools are the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Shaffei and the Hanbali . . . . The Hanbali 
School [which] is followed [in] Saudi Arabia ... is the school of Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal. 
Its fundamental principles were developed mainly by the jurist Ibn Taimiya." The Hanbali 
law, like the others, "is dominated by the principles of the Koran and of the 'Sunna' (i .e., 
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systems of law fundamental principles of the law of contract, 
namely, the principle of liberty of contract and the principle of 
respect for contract. 111 With regard to the interpretation of the con-
cession agreement, the tribunal noted that Moslem law has rules 
and principles of interpretation generally recognized by other major 
systems of law. 112 The tribunal took the view, however, that Saudi 
Arabian law alone could not govern the interpretation of the agree-
ment in this case for two reasons. The first reason was that 
"[i]nterpretation of contracts is not governed by rigid rules; it is 
rather an art, governed by principles of logic and common sense, 
which purports to lead to an adaptation, as reasonable as possible 
of the provisions of [the] contract to the facts of a dispute." 113 The 
second reason was that, because of the complexities of the conces-
sion agreement and the lack of much experience in oil operations, 
Saudi Arabian law, which was the proper law, "must, in case of 
need, be interpreted or supplemented by the general principles of 
law, by the custom and practice in the oil business and by notions 
of pure jurisprudence." 114 This was the case, especially, "whenever 
certain private rights-which must inevitably be recognized to the 
concessionaire if the Concession is not to be deprived of its sub-
stance-would not be secured in an unquestionable manner by the 
law in force in Saudi Arabia." 115 
This is clearly in accordance with a basic policy that the legal 
order of the grantor state, when it is the proper governing law, 
cannot be displaced because it lacks the sophistication or refine-
ments of other systems more familiar to the investor. It is clear that 
the tradition of the Prophet Mohamed), which are of Divine Revelation and which constitute 
the Shari'ah." The legal principles in these sources "have been developed by the science of 
'Fikh' (jurisprudence), which might be called a kind of Moslem common law. The interpreta-
tion of the jurisprudence ('Fikh') is given by the Ulemas or doctors in theological and legal 
matters." Id. at 162-63 (citations omitted). 
111. The tribunal elaborated these principles: 
The first principle is stated by lbn Taimiya as follows: "The following rule shall be 
obeyed: men shall be permitted to make all the transactions they need, unless these 
transactions are forbidden by the Book or by the Sunna." The second basic rule, in 
lbn Tiamiya's opinion, results from the fact that Moslem law does not distinguish 
between a treaty, a contract of public or administrative law and a contract of civil 
or commercial law. All [such] pacts must be observed, since God is a witness to any 
contract .... [A]s expressed in the Koran: "Be faithful to your pledge to God, 
when you enter into a pact." 
Id. at 163-64 (citations omitted). 
112. Id. at 173. 
113. Id. at 172. 
114. Id. at 169. 
115. Id. 
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the parties to an economic development agreement envisage such 
enrichment of the legal system of the grantor state by general princi-
ples of law and widely recognized international practices and 
usages. The tribunal, in fact, recognized that the parties in this case 
did exactly that. 116 
The opinion of the tribunal as a whole is not a paragon of 
clarity, but it is clear on the important question of the proper law 
of a concession agreement, namely, the law of the grantor state, 
supplemented as the need arises with world-wide customs and prac-
tices of the particular natural resource industry. Any other view of 
the form of the provision under consideration is untenable. 
4. PROVISIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
I treat here only those instances where the parties to a natural 
resource development agreement have expressly provided that in-
ternational law should govern their relationship. I leave for later 
consideration cases where vague terms in the agreement have been 
interpreted as implying an intention of the parties to submit the 
agreement to international law. 
An example of the case under consideration is provided by a 
concession agreement in 1933 between the Imperial Government of 
Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 117 Article 22 of the 
agreement provided for arbitration of any dispute between the par-
ties and stated that ''[t]he award shall be based on the juridical 
principles contained in Article 38 of the Statues [sic] of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice. "118 There seems to be no practi-
cal or doctrinal reason why a state cannot subject its contract with 
individuals to be governed by international law. Notwithstanding 
the general principle that a contract between a state and private 
individuals is not usually governed by international law, a state may 
116. Article 35 of the 1933 Concession Agreement which provided: 
Inasmuch as most of the obligations hereunder are imposed upon the Company 
and inasmuch as the interpretation of the English text, especially as regards techni-
cal obligations and requirements relating to the oil industry, has been fairly well 
established through long practice and experience in contracts such as the present one, 
it is agreed that while both texts shall have equal validity, nevertheless in case of 
any divergence of interpretation as to the Company's obligations hereunder, the 
English text shall prevail. 
Id. at 170. The Tribunal concluded that the parties unequivocally recognized "established 
custom and practice of the oil industry" and that "such custom and practice can therefor 
supplement an incomplete legal system." Id. at 170. 
117. Quoted in McNair, supra note 1, at 7-8. 
118. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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expressly submit its contractual relations with private individuals, 
or for that matter with other states, to international law .119 It is the 
prerogative of every state to treat private entities, insofar as their 
relation to the state is concerned, as subjects of international law 
for all or for particular purposes. As has been observed by a reputa-
ble scholar, "[i]n relation to itself, each subject of international 
law is free to recognize any other entity as a subject of international 
law" for any purpose. 120 
It should be observed, however, that even in such cases a tri-
bunal, in applying international law, is not necessarily precluded 
from considering the law of the contracting state where relevant. 
Even in purely interstate disputes, relevant principles of domestic 
law have been applied by international tribunals. For example, in 
the Norwegian Shipowners' Case, 121 the compromis between the 
United States and Norway directed the tribunal to apply 
"principles of law and equity." The tribunal rejected the contention 
of Norway that United States law was precluded. It declared that 
it could not ignore the local laws of the parties, except that in 
applying such law, any special rules, for example, those limiting the 
rights of individuals against the government, cannot bind it. The 
point I make here, then, is that even in cases where international 
law is expressly made the law of the development agreement, the 
national law of the grantor state may not be entirely excluded. 
Sometimes international law has been imported into agree-
ments between states and foreign private investors by treaty, espe-
cially treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign invest-
ments. A recent technique is to incorporate within a treaty a provi-
sion for referring disputes arising between a state and national 
investors to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes. Under the recent Agreement For the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments between Singapore and the United King-
dom 122 covering, among other types of investment, "business conces-
sions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to 
search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources," each 
party consents to submit to the Centre "any legal dispute arising 
119. See generally Mann, supra note 71. 
120. 1 G. ScHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (3d ed. 1957). 
121. Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. United States) 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 
307, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 362 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922). 
122. Done July 22, 1975, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 591 (1976); accord, Agree-
ment for the Promotion and Protection of Private Investments, done June 11, 1975, Egypt-
United Kingdom, reprinted in 14 lNT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1470 (1975). 
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between that Contracting Party and a national or company of the 
other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the latter in 
the territory of the former." 123 Each party has the right to institute 
arbitration proceedings in the Centre if "such dispute should arise 
and agreement cannot be reached ... between the parties to [the] 
dispute through pursuit of local remedies or otherwise, [and] if the 
national or company affected also consents in writing to submit the 
dispute to the Centre for settlement by arbitration under the Con-
vention . . . . 124 
Although the Convention does not envisage arbitration between 
states, the effect of instituting arbitration proceedings by a state 
party under this treaty is to turn the arbitration into one between 
states, and because states are now involved, application by the tri-
bunal of international law to the solution of the dispute becomes 
inevitable. 
Generally, in cases where the agreement expressly indicates the 
applicable law, the only problem should be the interpretation of 
what the parties have actually said. When, by a fair interpretation 
of the contractual provision, the intention of the parties is discov-
ered, it must be given the fullest recognition. 
B. Assertions Made Where the Agreement Contains No Clear Pro-
vision for the Applicable Law 
The determination of the applicable law is most controversial 
where the agreement contains no clear provision for the choice of 
law. Various assertions or claims are then made about the applica-
ble law. These assertions or claims are based mostly on the implica-
tions of vague words appearing in the agreements and on the nature 
of the development agreements themselves. 
1. IMPLICATIONS FROM EXPRESS WORDS IN THE AGREEMENT 
Many economic development agreements state that the rights 
and the obligations of the parties are based on good faith and good 
will and contain no other provision for the applicable law. For exam-
ple, article 38 of a recent agreement between Sapphire International 
Petroleums Ltd. and the National Iranian Oil Company125 (NIOC) 
123. Singapore-United Kingdom, art. 8, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 592. 
124. Id. 
125. Quoted in Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 
140 (1963). 
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(an Iranian government corporation), provided that the parties un-
dertook "to carry out the provisions of the contract in accordance 
with principles of good faith and good will and to respect the spirit 
as well as the letter of the agreement." 126 It also contained provisions 
for arbitration and specified the procedure for the appointment of 
the arbitrators. It fixed the location of the arbitration in Switzer-
land. A dispute arose between the parties, and an arbitral tribunal 
was set up in accordance with the agreement. 127 The tribunal, a sole 
arbitrator, considered the effect of article 38 and concluded that the 
provision for "good faith" and "good will" as well as for arbitration, 
was "scarcely compatible with the strict application of the internal 
law of a particular country" and that "[i]t much more often calls 
for the application of general principles of law based upon reason 
and upon the common practice of civilized countries."128 The tri-
bunal rejected any contention that Iranian law governed, observing 
that before and after the agreement with Sapphire International 
Petroleums Ltd. Iran had concluded other agreements129 in which 
the application of international law and general principles of law 
recognized by civilized states was expressly provided. It concluded 
that the principles of good faith required that Iran could not rely on 
the "absence of an express provision regarding the law applicable" 
in the Sapphire agreement to deny a principle which it had accepted 
"in previous agreements which had the same object." 130 
The arbitrator cited and relied on arbitral precedents in which 
similar phrases appeared in the concession agreements. In the first 
such arbitration, Lena Goldfields v. Soviet Union, 131 the arbitrator 
interpreted "good will" and "good faith" as requiring the applica-
tion of general principles of international law, not merely the appli-
cation of the laws of the Soviet Union, to aspects of the agreement 
126. Id. 
127. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) refused to appoint its own arbitrator. 
The sole arbitrator was then appointed by the President of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, in 
accordance with article 41 of the agreement. Id. at 140-41. The NIOC then refused to partici-
pate in the arbitration. Id. at 161-62. 
128. Id. at 173. 
129. Id. at 174-75. The Tribunal referred to the Consortium Agreement of 1954, between 
Iran and the National Iranian Oil Consortium, and agreements concluded by Iran with other 
companies under the Iranian Petroleum Act of July 31, 1957. 
130. Id. at 175; art. 14 of the Petroleum Act provides for conciliation and arbitration as 
the applicable dispute settlement mechanisms and leaves the details to be negotiated in 
particular concession agreements . 
131. The Times (London), Sept. 3, 1930, at 7, col. 1; see Nussbaum, The Arbitration 
Between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1951). 
33
Onejeme: Natural Resources Agreements
Published by SURFACE, 1977
34 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 5:1 
in question. The second arbitral precedent relied on by the arbitra-
tor concerned a dispute between Sheik Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and 
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. 132 There, Lord Ash-
quit of Bishopstone, the sole arbitrator, stated that the terms "good 
will" and "good intentions" repel the notion that the law of any 
particular country, as such, could be appropriate. 133 These terms, in 
his view, invited, and indeed mandated, the application of princi-
ples rooted in good sense and in the practice of civilized nations, a 
sort of "modern law of nature." 134 
In reaching these conclusions, the arbitral tribunals were un-
doubtedly, to use Lord McNair's phrase, "groping after some legal 
system which is not the territorial law of either party." 135 It is also 
clear that they were giving a meaning to the terms used by the 
parties in their agreement-a contextual meaning, one would as-
sume. There can be no doubt that such a phrase, in a contract 
governed by English or American law, would not import the applica-
tion of international law to the contract. 
The appearance in concession agreements of phrases such as 
have been described here raises many questions: Why are they 
included? By using the phrases, do the parties intend a reference to 
the applicable law, or are they simply reassuring one another? Lord 
McN air offered the suggestion that the parties are groping for some 
law. This is a plausible explanation, no doubt, but given the desire 
of the foreign companies to escape the consequences of local laws of 
developing countries, why, if the intention was to subject the agree-
ment to international law or to the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized states, do the agreements not expressly so state? 
It may be suggested that the tribunals were attempting to impose 
on the parties a legal system with which they were more familiar. 
It is not without consequence that these tribunals consisted of West-
ern scholars or lawyers136 who, if they were to accept the law of the 
countries involved in those arbitrations as the proper law of the 
agreements, would be less qualified to apply it. It is interesting that 
132. Petroleum Dev. [Trucial Coast] Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (1951), 
1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 247 (1952). See also Petroleum Dev. [Qatar] Ltd. v. Ruler of Qatar, 
18 l.L.R. 161 (1950) . 
133. 18 I.L.R. at 148-49. 
134. Id. at 149. 
135. McNair, supra note 1, at 10. 
136. See Lord Asquith of Bishopstone (Abu Dhabi Arbitration) ; the Right Hon. Sir 
Alfred Bucknill (Arbitration between Ruler of Qatar and Int'l Marine Oil Co., Ltd.); Dr. 
Stutzer and Sir Leslie Scott (Lena Goldfields Arbitration) . 
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the ARAMCO arbitration, 137 which included Moslem lawyers, 138 
found, contrary to opinions expressed in these earlier cases, that 
Moslem law was one of the major legal systems of the world and was 
capable of regulating modern concession agreements. 139 
It has not been possible to determine at whose initiative such 
terms were included in those concession agreements. It would not 
be surprising if they were found to have been included at the in-
stance of the local authorities. After all, the agreements were con-
cluded when there might have been, to quote Lord McNair again, 
" 'too great might on the one side, and unmight on the other', or too 
great commercial experience on the one side and lack of it on the 
other .... " 140 At that time, there could be no doubt about the 
commercial inexperience of the sheiks in the petroleum industry. 
They may therefore have been seeking to ensure that the companies, 
which alone controlled all the information used to calculate benefits 
accruing to them, would be fair and honest. If this view is plausible, 
then it is reasonable to suggest that the provision for good faith and 
good will could not refer to the applicable law. 
If this view is wrong and the terms are deemed to refer to the 
applicable law, another question is raised: Why could "good will" 
and "good faith" not operate within the local law? In fact, the 
decision in Lena Goldfields 141 has been appropriately criticized for 
this reason by Arthur Nussbaum, who took the view, contrary to the 
tribunal's, that Soviet law governed the agreement in that case in 
all respects, and that, in effect, the provision for "good will and good 
faith, as well as reasonable interpretation" was at best a hope that 
Soviet law would do justice between the parties. 142 
Notwithstanding these opinions, a more reasonable inference 
from such provisions, and one which takes relevant facts and poli-
cies into account, is that the parties regard the legal order of the 
grantor state as the basic law of the agreement. This inference is 
also consistent with respect to principles of international law or 
universal customs and usages when these aid the reasonable inter-
pretation of the agreement. The impact of a natural resource agree-
137. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 1.L.R. 117 (1958). 
138. The original arbitration tribunal consisted of arbitrators Habachy and Badawi. Dr. 
Badawi died during the proceedings and was succeeded by H.E. Mahmoud Hassan. 271.L.R. 
at 117. 
139. Id. at 162. 
140. McNair, supra note 1, at 2. 
141. The Times (London), Sept. 3, 1930, at 7, col. 1. 
142. Nussbaum, supra note 131, at 36, 40. 
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ment upon the social and legal orders of the grantor state is so 
pervasive that any other inference is not permissible. The presump-
tion in favor of a grantor state's legal order as the creator of property 
rights in the natural resources of the state is very strong and must 
not be so easily displaced. To quote an Iranian court of first instance 
which rejected the conclusions reached by the arbitrator in Sapphire 
International Petroleums Ltd., 143 "[ t]he material and spiritual re-
lations which link [the concession agreement] to the laws and the 
judicial system" of the grantor state support and confirm its con-
tinuing and constant control. 144 
2. ASSERTIONS BASED ON THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENTS 
The debate about the law of economic development agreements 
under this heading can be conveniently divided into three schools 
of thought: (1) the internationalists, (2) the sub-internationalists, 
and (3) the localists. Each of these schools justifies its position by 
pointing to one or more characteristics of economic development 
agreements. There is little disagreement about the factual descrip-
tion of the essential elements of such agreements. As summarized 
by Lord McNair, they always involve a relationship, usually con-
tractual, between a sovereign state and private entities; they relate 
to natural resources over which the state exercises right of owner-
ship; they call for the expenditures of large sums of money by the 
private party; their subject matter constitutes important raw mate-
rials indispensable to global development, and their conclusion, 
most of the time, involves the exercise of the government's public 
authority. All sides to the debate appeal to these and other factors 
to justify their positions. 
a. The Internationalists 
The "internationalists" consist of scholars and some arbitrators 
who assert that economic development agreements between a gran-
tor state and a foreign investor should be governed by international 
law. They begin by asserting that such agreements possess an inter-
national or quasi-international character. 145 They list numerous fac-
143. Iranian Court Decision on Arbitral Award in Dispute Between Sapphire Int'l Petro-
leums Ltd. and the National Iranian Oil Co., judgment of Dec. 1, 1963, Court of First 
Instance, Teheran, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1118, 1123 (1970). 
144. Id. 
145. See Carlston, International Role of Concession Agreements, 52 Nw. L. REv. 618 
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tors relating to such contracts which, they believe, make this char-
acterization inevitable. The following factors are selective. 
It is said that these agreements confer unusual rights of a semi-
political character, such as complete freedom to export and import, 
and are usually of long duration. The agreements may at times 
confer immunity from taxation. From inception, they may engage 
the diplomatic or "good offices" intervention of the state of the 
concessionaire. 
The agreements generate movement of materials and personnel 
to and from the grantor state, 148 and constitute the means for ex-
ploiting and distributing mineral resources internationally. Their 
continued functioning constitutes a basic expectation of the world 
community .147 In addition, since there is usually no domestic market 
for the products, the concession is actually international in charac-
ter. The fact that one of the parties to the concession agreement is 
a state is further evidence in support of "internationalization." 
With regard to this point, Dr. Mann observed that if a party to a 
contract is an international person, particularly a state, there exists 
ipso facto a sufficient connection with supranational rules of law 
which, on any view of the proper law theory, may enable and justify 
the parties in delocalizing their contract and submitting it to what 
may be called public international law .148 He added that such inter-
nationalization would make applicable the general treaty law or the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, as provided 
for in article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Court. 
The fact that the agreements often contain provisions for the 
possible appointment of the arbitrators by an international official 
has also been adduced as an argument supporting the view that 
such agreements are governed by international law. It is pointed out 
that many of the more modern agreements provide that if the par-
ties fail to agree on the appointment of arbitrators, the President or 
the Vice-President of the International Court of Justice should per-
form that function. 149 
(1958); Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons, 35 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1960); McNair, supra note 1, at 3-4; Schwebel, supra note 2, at 266; Verdross, 
Protection of Private Property Under Quasi-International Agreements, 6 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 
355 (1959); Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 l.L.R. 136, 171 
(1963). 
146. See Ray, supra note 2, at 17. 
147. See Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 
AM. J. INT'L L. 277, 289-96 (1957). 
148. Mann, supra note 145, at 44. 
149. In the concession agreement concluded between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and Iran, 
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These factors are admittedly important. They certainly impart 
international aspects to the relationship. But it is quite a different 
thing to conclude from these that the agreement has a character 
other than that of an institution of the public and private law of the 
grantor state. The function of an arbitrator appointed by the Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice is designated "extra-
judicial, " 150 and, therefore, has no legal significance apart from its 
relevance as a means of solving a deadlock. It is perhaps only a 
demonstration by the parties of their faith in the impartiality, pres-
tige, and authority of the Court. It has been suggested that article 
13(1) of the rules of the Court, 151 which disqualifies the President of 
the Court from presiding over a dispute between two states of one 
of which he is a national, ought not to apply to this extrajudicial 
function. 152 Moreover, the official of the Court so designated is not 
obliged to accept the function since parties make such arrangements 
without prior consultation with the Court. Jully noted that in at 
least one case involving a concession agreement, the President of the 
International Court of Justice rejected a party's request to appoint 
an umpire on the grounds that the power was conferred on the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and that there had been 
no request by the parties that the International Court of Justice 
should perform the function. 153 It cannot seriously be argued that, 
although the agreement in this case had an international character 
because an international official was designated to appoint an um-
pire, it lost that character because the Court failed or had no oppor-
tunity to make the appointment. Such a conclusion would be ab-
surd. 
It is to be observed that the parties themselves do not consider 
this function of the President of the Court as anything other than 
administrative. Any contrary view might subject some concession 
agreements to the laws of another system. The only connection with 
art. 22 provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, the umpire of which was to be 
appointed by the president of the l.C.J. if the arbitrators selected by the two parties could 
not agree. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, l.C.J. Pleadings 268 (1952). See Jully, infra note 
150, at 402-03. 
150. Jully, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement, 48 AM. J. lNT'L L. 380, 399 (1954). 
151. l.C.J. RULES art. 13, para. 1 reads as follows: "If the President is a national of one 
of the parties to a case brought before the Court, he will abstain from exercising his function 
as President in respect of that case." 
152. See Jully, supra note 150, at 400. But see id. at 406. Jully observed that if the art. 
13, para. 1 limitation is not followed, legitimate awards may be repudiated because the 
arbitrator was appointed by a national of one of the parties to the dispute. 
153. Id. at 403. 
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the agreement may be the fact that a public official of that system, 
under the clause of the agreement, has the function of appointing 
one of the arbitrators or an umpire. In agreements where the func-
tion is given to, but not exercised by, the President of the Swiss 
Cantonal Tribunal, the presidents of the supreme courts of Den-
mark, Sweden, or Brazil, in that order, exercise the function.1 54 
There can be no doubt, however, that the parties could not be 
deemed to have left the choice of law governing their agreement to 
such a gamble. 
Another contention in favor of internat"ional law as the govern-
ing law is expedience. Judge Philip Jessup wrote that it is expedient 
to apply international law to concession agreements because it helps 
to overcome the problem of the unwillingness of the grantor state 
to submit to foreign law and the unwillingness of the alien individ-
ual or corporation to leave the adjudication of disputes to the courts 
of the grantor state. 155 Another scholar thinks that international law 
has advantages both procedurally and substantively, and is more 
easily drafted into the agreements than is the provision of a specific 
law. 156 Delaume stated that application of international law is the 
only alternative where the circumstances of a particular law "make 
it 'impossible to assume that the parties intended to be governed by 
a national system of law.' " 157 
Long ago, Dr. Mann made a strong case for the application of 
international law stricto sensu to economic development agree-
ments. He stated that where the parties have not expressly or im-
pliedly provided for a law to govern their contract, a presumption 
in favor of international law has the great utility of assuring that the 
existence of, and faith in, such contracts "would be immune from 
any encroachment by a system of municipal law in exactly the same 
manner as in the case of a treaty between two international persons 
•••• "
158 He contemplated that the application of international law 
in this case would be undertaken by national or international offi-
cials, judges, or arbitrators having jurisdiction over the contract. 
The substantive law which they would apply would largely be de-
154. See Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 l.L.R. 136, 141 
(1963). 
155. P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 141 (1959). 
156. See Wadmond, Arbitration Between Governments and Foreign Private Firms, 1961 
AM. Soc'v INT'L L . PRoc . 69, 73. 
157. Delaume, The Proper Law of Loans Concluded by International Persons: A Restate-
ment and a Forecast, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 78 (1962). 
158. Mann, supra note 145, at 43. 
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rived from those principles of law "accepted semper ubique et 
omnibus," such as those which govern the interpretation of com-
mercial treaties. 159 
In response to the objection of those who fear that 
"internationalization" of such contracts may make their perform-
ance impossible because public international law has not yet suc-
ceeded in developing the necessary legal rules, 160 Dr. Mann would 
reply that such an objection overlooks the fact that treaties between 
sovereign states may pertain to substantially the same subject mat-
ter as the contracts between a state and private individual, and that 
public international law has rules which are already developed or 
which are in the process of being developed. 
What is objectionable about the internationalists' position is 
their apparent motive. The internationalists do not emphasize that 
international law should be used for a more reasonable interpreta-
tion of the agreement or for a better means of evaluating the com-
patability of the contracting sovereign's regulatory powers with the 
minimum standards of international law governing the treatment of 
foreigners within its jurisdiction. Rather, the internationalists em-
phasize the need for such contracts in order to escape the compre-
hensive and continuing authority of the contracting state as an end 
in itself.161 
The contention that international law should form the basis of 
economic development agreements has also been supported by as-
sertions that such agreements, because of their international 
connections, are in reality international agreements. This issue was 
considered in 1950 by the International Court of Justice in the 
Anglo-Iranian Case. 162 This case involved a dispute which arose be-
tween Great Britain and Iran over the cancellation by Iran of a 
concession of the Anglo-Iranian Company (a British company). Iran 
contested the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that the dispute 
was between Iran and the British company and was not within 
159. Id. 
160. See Wolff, Some Observations on the Autonomy of Contracting Parties in the Con-
flict of Laws, 35 GROTIUS Soc'y 143 (1950); Friedmann, Some Impacts of Social Organization 
on International Law, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 484 (1956). 
161. Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963). 
One reason given by the arbitrator for excluding the application oflranian law in the Sapphire 
case was that the foreign company should be assured legal security. This could not be done 
since it is within Iran's power to change its laws. Id. at 171; see note 145 supra. 
162. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1952] I.C.J. 92. See Fitzmaurice, The Law and Proce-
dure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty 
Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 203, 240 (1957). 
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Iran's declaration conferring jurisdiction on the Court under the 
optional clause of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice.163 The British government contended that the Court had juris-
diction because the concession agreement cancelled by Iran had a 
dual character: it was a concession to the company as well as a 
treaty between the United Kingdom and Iran. 
In order to appreciate the argument of the United Kingdom, it 
is necessary to explain the historical background of the concession 
agreement. The Anglo-Iranian Company held a previous oil conces-
sion in Iran which was cancelled by Iran in 1932. The United King-
dom protested this action in vain, and finally submitted the matter 
to the Council of the League of Nations.164 The dispute was then put 
on the agenda of the Council, and was later withdrawn when the 
Council was notified that the company, Iran, and the British gov-
ernment had agreed to forego the Council proceedings and to pursue 
a settlement. The negotiation which ensued resulted in the 1933 
concession agreement between Iran and the company. The Council 
was duly informed of this. In presenting his report to the League of 
Nations, the Rapporteur declared that "the dispute between His 
Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom and the Imperial 
Government of Persia is now finally settled."165 
In the Anglo-Iranian Case, the United Kingdom contended be-
fore the Court that the above proceedings constituted a "tacit" or 
"implied" agreement between it and Iran and must be considered 
to be within the meaning of the term "treaties or conventions" in 
the Iranian declaration. It further contended that the concession 
agreement of 1933 terminated the dispute between it and Iran and 
that for this reason the agreement was international in character .168 
In rejecting this attempt by the United Kingdom to assimilate 
the concession agreement into a treaty through the back door or 
"indirection," 167 the Court declared: 
163. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1952) I.C.J. at 130-34. 
164. See Hudson, The Thirteenth Year of the World Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-14 
(1952). 
165. Id. at 14. 
166. The United Kingdom relied on the Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
District of Gex, [1932) P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46. The King of Sardinia, by means of a 
manifesto addressed to them, had directed the Sardinian customs, at the instance of the 
Canton of Valais, to withdraw the customs line which Sardinia was obliged to withdraw by a 
treaty manifesto. The manifesto was viewed by the Court as terminating an international 
dispute and thus acqured an international character. See H. LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 211 (1957); see also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
Case, [1952) I.C.J. 92, 113. 
167. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 164. 
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The Court cannot accept the view that the contract signed be-
tween the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
has a double character. It is nothing more than a concessionary 
contract between a government and a foreign corporation. The 
United Kingdom Government is not a party to the contract; there 
is no privity of contract between the Government of Iran and the 
Government of the United Kingdom. Under the contract the Iranian 
Government cannot claim from the United Kingdom Government 
any rights which it may claim from the Company, nor can it be 
called upon to perform towards the United Kingdom Government 
any obligations which it is bound to perform towards the Company. 
The document bearing the signatures of the representatives of the 
Iranian Government and the Company has a single purpose: the 
purpose of regulating the relations between that Government and 
the Company in regard to the concession. It does not regulate in any 
way the relations between the two Governments. 168 
The Court eventually decided that it had no jurisdiction by 
virtue of the Iranian declaration, which included treaties and con-
ventions only. Although the Court was primarily concerned with 
jurisdiction, it clearly regarded the concession as a private contract 
subject to Iranian law. This view was supported by Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice169 who pointed out that such an agreement, whether consid-
ered from the point of view of the government party concerned or 
of the private party, cannot in any technical sense be equated with 
a treaty or other kind of international agreement. He stated further, 
that although an international tribunal may find it necessary to 
consider and pronounce upon the terms of such agreements, they are 
basically contracts governed by the appropriate system of domestic 
law. Disputes concerning them fall within the competence of the 
local courts. If the disputes are referred to arbitration, the tribunal 
must rank as a private, and not an international, tribunal. 170 
Except in those cases where a concession agreement can be 
assimilated into a treaty, the only way it can reach the international 
level is through diplomatic espousal, by his home government, of 
the claim of the investor. As was explained by Sir Gerald Fitzmaur-
ice, the international aspect of a concession is quite distinct from 
its domestic aspect. The domestic aspect concerns the relationship 
of the concessionaire, national or foreign, with the state. The inter-
168. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1952] I.C.J. 92, 112. 
169. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 164, at 246. 
170. Id. 
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national aspect concerns the state's treatment of the foreign inves-
tor and raises questions pertaining to the relation between the state 
and the investor's state, and not to the relation between the state 
and the concessionaire. 171 It is to these relations or questions that 
international law properly applies. 
In The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, 172 the Attor-
ney General of the United Kingdom, in the course of his argument 
on the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
took a different view of the legal status of concession agreements 
than the one maintained by the British government in the Anglo-
Iranian Case. He pointed out to the Court that: 
Few things can be worse for the dignity of the Court than that it 
should find itself involved in trying a multitude of cases which are, 
in fact, claims by private persons such as are dealt with in the 
ordinary municipal courts, but which are diverted to this tribunal 
because it happens that the respondent is a sovereign State and the 
claimant is a subject of some other Power.173 
In his view Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions involved purely 
questions of domestic law and did not get to the international level 
merely because it concerned a state and an alien individual. 
A case for applying international law to agreements under con-
sideration can be built around the fact that many countries now 
subscribe to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States, 174 under which 
disputes arising from economic development agreements can be 
submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes created under the Convention. The arbitral tribunal, 
under the auspices of the Centre, is certainly an international tri-
bunal and, as such, traditionally applies international law. The 
agreement by states to submit investment disputes to the Centre 
may establish state practice from which customary international 
law can develop. However, the law to be applied by the tribunal is 
limited by the express choice of the parties. 175 It is true that the 
tribunal as an international tribunal may apply international law; 
however, a reasonable interpretation of its powers under article 42 
171. Id. 
172. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, (1924] P.C.1.J., ser. A, No. 2; see Hom-
sey, Foreign Investment and International Law, 3 INT'L L.Q. 552 (1950). 
173. Homsey, supra note 172, at 557. 
174. March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.l.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
175. See note 98 supra and accompanying text. 
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of the Convention would indicate that it can apply that law only to 
supplement gaps in the law of the state party .176 
It can also be argued that certain U .N. resolutions, particularly 
resolution 1803 (XVII) dealing with permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, provide evidence of the international character of 
natural resources development agreements. 177 As has been indicated 
earlier, resolution 1803 (XVII) implies that international law has 
equal status with national law in regulating those agreements. 178 
However, quite apart from any prescriptive value which this resolu-
tion may have, the fact that all references to international law in 
subsequent U .N. resolutions on the subject were omitted is a clear 
indication that international law is no longer viewed as governing 
economic development agreements unless the parties have so ex-
pressly provided. 
I cannot overemphasize my rejection of the internationalization 
of economic development agreements, which results in their being 
placed beyond the reach of the state's comprehensive responsibility 
to promote the safety, security, and well-being of its body politic. 
This comprehensive responsibility of the state creates a proper in-
ference that, in construing concession agreements, whatever per-
tains to the sovereign right and duty of the state which is not ex-
pressly or by reasonable implication given away in favor of the con-
cessionaire must be deemed to be reserved to the state. To hold 
otherwise would violate a basic principle of international as well as 
national law, that foreign persons and corporations operating by 
agreement within a state are subject to the laws and regulations of 
that state unless it is expressly agreed otherwise. 
As has already been indicated, a state which is party to an 
economic development agreement can, by its own free will, subject 
its contract to international law. This may be achieved in a number 
of ways, for example, (1) where the agreement is embodied in or is 
the basis of an international agreement proper, 179 (2) where the con-
cession agreement, which embodies the terms of a settlement, is 
annexed to a report made to an international organization and is 
deposited in the records of that organization, or (3) where the con-
176. Id. 
177. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, para. 3, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962) . 
178. See notes 28-40 supra and accompanying text. 
179. See notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text . 
179.1. McNair, supra note 1. 
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cession contracts contain express provisions that the instrument 
shall be governed by international law or general principles of law 
as a source of international law. 
Where any of these is present, international community policy, 
giving deference to the sovereignty of states and the protection of 
agreements, would require that the expressed will of the parties be 
upheld. 
b. The Sub-Internationalists 
Under this heading, I group all those scholars and arbitral tri-
bunals which take the position that economic development agree-
ments not specifying the applicable law are not properly governed 
by either the legal order of the grantor state or international law 
stricto sensu. This group views such agreements as possessing cer-
tain unique features which place them outside the present dichot-
omy of municipal and international law. 
Lord McN air first proposed this view in an address to the 
American Bar Association Convention in London (1958) and later, 
in the article referred to in this study. 179· 1 The basis of his thesis is 
that this kind of agreement is entered into by a capital importing 
country with no developed legal system and a foreign corporation 
with capital to supply, and that by not specifying the law to be 
applied, the parties must be deemed to have intended that their 
contract should be governed by the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations. Such is not public international law 
stricto sensu, because that law is "jus inter gentes," but a third 
system of law which "shares with public international law a com-
mon source of recruitment and inspiration." It was stated that: 
There is some evidence that [article 38(1)(c)] is likely to acquire 
another sphere of operation, namely, as affording in certain cases 
the choice of a legal system for the regulation of some of the new 
numerous contracts made between corporations ... and the Gov-
ernments of certain countries which have natural resources awaiting 
development but not enough capital or skill available for that pur-
pose.1so 
Lord McNair's thesis was soon accepted by others. For exam-
ple, another writer stated in reference to economic development 
agreements: 
180. Id. at 1. 
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We will find that there are two generally accepted principles-the 
ad hoc law of contract and pacta sunt servanda-which have sur-
vived for centuries, and which, when supplemented by general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations, by jurisprudence gener-
ally and by applicable custom, will comprise a system of law both 
adequate and desirable as the system for which we are looking. 181 
Professor Ver dross has declared that such concession agree-
ments are "quasi-public-international contracts" which are not gov-
erned by municipal law or by public international law, but are 
submitted to the "lex contractus of the contract or concession."182 
They constitute a third group of contracts which is characterized by 
the fact that the private rights which are thereby created are sub-
jected to a new legal system established by the agreement of the 
parties. Such "lex contractus," created by a quasi-public-
international contract, regulates the relations between the parties. 
The weakness of the position of this group arises from the na-
ture of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
Both Lord McNair and Mr. Ray recognize that there is no catalogue 
of such general principles of law and that more and more of them 
will come to be expressed as they are required in specific cases. 183 It 
should be pointed out that certainty of legal rights and obligations 
in such contracts is of utmost importance. Agreements create legal 
rights and duties which cannot exist in a vacuum, but must exist 
in a legal system within which such questions as validity, applica-
tion, and interpretation are confronted. It seems strange that this 
group would prefer to regard an uncertain tertium quid system of 
law as the most appropriate to fill this vacuum rather than to apply 
the municipal law of the grantor state which alone contains specific 
rules relating to natural resources. The certainty of obligations is 
not served when parties rest the determination of their rights and 
obligations on general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions in the sense Lord McNair and others have used the concept. 
Even with respect to general principles of law in the sense of 
article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
there will be uncertainties about their recognition. For example, to 
which and how many legal systems must a particular principle be 
known? Answers to these questions would call for expertise in com-
parative law, which few arbitrators and judges have. This is the real 
181. Ray, supra note 2, at 11. 
182. Verdross, supra note 145, at 358-59. 
183. McNair, supra note 1, at 15; Ray, supra note 2, at 44. 
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danger of placing reliance on general principles of law recognized by 
civilized states. A scholar of comparative law has complained that 
a judge may apply his own law without reference to comparative 
systems. 184 This danger is well demonstrated in the Abu Dhabi Arbi-
tration Award, 185 in which Lord Asquith, as the sole arbitrator, ap-
plied English law, even to the extent of quoting English decisions. 
It has been noted that: 
If subsection (c) of Art. 38 is to have any real value in its application 
to international cases, recourse must be had to the advice and les-
sions to be obtained from comparative law, for only then will the 
generality of any particular legal principle be properly established, 
and once established its true interpretation propounded. 186 
The mere fact that a principle is to be found in several systems 
of private law does not, of course, vest it with the attribute of univer-
sality and entitle it to be translated into the international sphere. 
There may be, and often are, other factors to be taken into account, 
which may have the effect either of depriving the principle of its 
apparent universality or of rendering it unfit to function in the 
environment of international relations. 187 
Mr. Gutteridge, an acknowledged scholar of comparative law, 
once complained that the general principles were derived mainly 
from Western systems of law, and principally from continental 
Romanistic systems. He noted that the arbitral tribunals that have 
made decisions based on general principles of law were manned by 
jurists of this system and that they ignored other systems of law. 188 
Article 38(1)(c) can properly serve only as a residual source 
from which community decisionmakers fill any gaps in the interna-
tional and municipal legal structure. General principles will come 
into existence as the outcome of experience gained over a long period 
in which international disputes are settled through arbitration. Fre-
quent invocation and application of principles will place "the seal 
of international approval on a practice shown by such experience to 
184. Discussion, The Meaning and Scope of Article 38( 1)( c) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 38 GROTIUS Soc'y 125, 127 (1952) (statement by Mr. Gutteridge). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 127-28; see McDougall & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Di-
verse Systems of Public Order, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3 (1960). 
187. See Discussion, The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(1)( c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, 38 GROTIUS Soc'y 125, 130 (1952) (statement by Mr. Cheng). 
188. Gutteridge, Comparative Law and the Law of Nations, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 2 
(1944). 
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provide a suitable criterion of the requirements of justice." 189 
The rudimentary condition of comparative jurisprudence is the 
reason for the problem. In the light of today's standards, there ap-
pears to be no justification for the dominance of Western systems 
of law. If the dominance is maintained, it would only give a meaning 
to "principles recognized by civilized nations" which fails to de-
scribe the new situations that "have arisen since the age of Grotius 
when the law of Rome was the basic element in ... the law of 
Europe and was universally regarded as the standard by which jus-
tice was measured." 190 
Whatever may have been the prospects of a catalogue of general 
principles emerging in concrete cases, as indicated by Lord McNair, 
the reality has been that "general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations," based on Western legal systems or Western-
dominated international law, have become a subject where interna-
tional opinion is diverging instead of converging.191 This phenome-
non ought not to frighten us, for it is common with any institution 
in the process of change.192 The consensus will emerge when the 
opinion of all mankind is polled and analyzed. It will emerge when 
the new order for which the developing countries are clamoring is 
taken into full account.193 When this happens, there can emerge a 
189. Id. at 2. 
190. Id. at 4; see also C.W. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 155 (1958). 
191. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Court 
said, with respect to limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens, 
[t]he disagreement as to relevant international law standards reflects an even more 
basic divergence between the national interests of capital importing and capital 
exporting nations and between the social ideologies of those countries that favor state 
control of a considerable portion of the means of production and those that adhere 
to a free enterprise system. 
376 U.S. at 430. 
With respect to the views of developing countries on the extent to which they are bound 
by rules of international law, including the general principles of law in the fashioning of which 
they did not participate, see Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 
a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961). Jenks poses the ques-
tion: 
How far can we successfully invoke general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations in a world in which the civil and common law must share their former 
supremacy with Islamic law, Hindu law, Chinese law and Soviet law? How helpful 
is judicial precedent, international and national, in this new perspective? 
C.W. JENKS, supra note 190, at 91. 
192. See Stone, What Price Effectiveness?, 1956 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 198, 203, where 
the author states: "it must remain a constant source of perplexity to distinguish departures 
from existing rules of international law which are merely outrageous breaches, from those 
which manifest inchoate legal change. But this is a perplexity with which, regrettably, we 
must learn to live." 
193. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. 
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system of general principles of law upon which parties to economic 
development agreements can base their rights and obligations. 
c. The Localists 
This school views economic development agreements as legal 
arrangements of a purely domestic character. The localists' position 
is based on theoretical and pragmatic considerations. As a starting 
point, the localists emphasize such general principles as: agree-
ments concluded between a state and an individual cannot be gov-
erned by international law, and, a state is presumed to contract 
under its own law and cannot be deemed to have submitted to any 
other law without its express consent.194 
According to the general practice of the majority of states, 
agreements dealing with land and other land-based natural re-
sources are characterized as real property rights. This was empha-
sized by the ARAMCO arbitral tribunal, which stated "[ w]hat is 
extracted from a mine or from a quarry is not a product of the soil; 
it is the soil itself which is being extracted; the 'exploitation' inevit-
ably results in the exhaustion of the mine." 195 An investor who ac-
quires such real property rights must do so under the laws and 
policies of the state concerned. 
The importance of natural resources in the national policies of 
a developing country provides the most pragmatic and compelling 
reasons for subjecting to the legal order of the state all arrangements 
for resource development. The U .N. General Assembly resolutions 
and others to which I referred earlier emphasize this importance. 
Together they recognize that the right of every state to dispose of 
its natural resources is inalienable and that the creation and 
strengthening of that inalienable right reinforces the economic inde-
pendence of the state. 
On the very important question of the status of the agreements 
between foreign investors and the developing states, resolution 1803 
(XVII), 196 which shares the acceptance of both capital exporting and 
Res. 3201, 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Programme 
of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, id. 
at 5; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
194. Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, [1929] 
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 20, at 42; Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of the Brazilian Federal 
Loans Issued in France, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 21, at 121. 
195. PLANIOL, I ThAITt ~LEMENTAIRE DE DROIT C1v1L 1173 (3d ed. 1939) quoted in 27 
l.L.R. at 157. 
196. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G .A. Res. 1803, 17 U .N. GAOR, 
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capital importing countries, is clearly in favor of the states' legal 
orders as the governing law. The resolution declares: 
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, 
as well as the import of the foreign capital required for these pur-
poses, should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which 
the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable 
with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such 
activities. 
3. . . . where authorization is granted, the capital imported and the 
earnings on that capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by 
the national legislation in force and by international law. 
4. [In case of controversies about compensation arising from nation-
alization, expropriation, or requisitioning] the national jurisdiction 
of the state taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, 
upon agreement by sovereign states and other parties concerned, 
settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or 
international adjudication . . . . 197 
Subsequent resolutions of the U .N. and other international or-
ganizations, by omitting all references to international law, have 
reinforced the claims for applying national law and policy. They 
represent a rejection of any idea of "delocalizing" or 
"internationalizing" agreements between developing states and for-
eign investors. This was clear from the position taken in debates by 
representatives of the developing countries. For example, the repre-
sentative of Iraq, in explaining the vote of his delegation in the 
General Assembly during debates on resolution 1803 (XVII) 198 in 
1962, stated his view that "agreements signed between companies 
and sovereign States [are] simple contracts, governed and pro-
tected by the domestic laws of sovereign States" and found it 
"rather strange" and "illogical" for an international document such 
as the resolution under consideration to emphasize the observance 
of such contracts. 199 Mr. Schweitzer, the Chilean representative who 
was also on the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty, explained 
that the basic idea of the draft resolution of the Commission, in 
respect of agreements between states and foreign investors, is that 
the agreements are not immune to the laws of the states, but can 
be abrogated in the national interest against payment of compensa-
Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Report of the Second Committee, 
17 U.N. GAOR (1194th mtg.) 1133, 1135, U.N. Doc. A/5344/Add. 1 (1962). 
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tion as determined by the local laws. 200 The recognition of the right 
of the states to abrogate such contracts against payment of compen-
sation affirms the legal position that such agreements are subject 
to local laws and policy; they could not be so treated if they had an 
international character.201 The provision in paragraph 8, the opera-
tive paragraph of resolution 1803 (XVII), that "[f]oreign invest-
ment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign states 
shall be observed in good faith, " 202 is an expression of a desirable 
policy that states, in their own interests, should not lightly disregard 
their agreements. It cannot be taken to mean that, as a matter of 
legal obligation, they could not do so. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Past trends in decisions dealing with the laws governing eco-
nomic development agreements and present realities combine to 
affirm the authority and control of national legal orders over the 
exploitation of the natural resources of a state. The present realities 
are that all states have made and are making claims to be the sole 
regulators of their natural resources. These claims are pursued at 
various levels of interaction in both internal and external arenas, 
and have largely been recognized by all. With particular reference 
to the developing countries, the numerous resolutions of the General 
Assembly on permanent sovereignty over natural resources and on 
a new international economic order, the resolutions and concrete 
actions of the natural resources producer organizations, such as 
OPEC, as well as the various actions of individual developing coun-
tries aimed at gaining full control over their natural resources, con-
stitute important new factors which must be taken into account in 
making decisions about applicable law of economic development 
agreements. These new factors affirm the control of states over their 
natural resources. Such control can be effectively excluded only 
where there is conclusive evidence that a state has consented to such 
exclusion, but not otherwise. 
The old argument based on the suggestion that the legal sys-
tems of developing countries are unsuitable for regulating complex 
economic development agreements has become untenable. That 
suggestion was first made in the Abu Dhabi Award, where an arbi-
200. 17 U.N. GAOR, C.2 (834th mtg.) 225, 230-32, U.N. Doc. NC.2/SR. 834 (1962). 
201. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17 at 31-32. 
202. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, 16, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962) . 
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trator found that the state of the law of Abu Dhabi does not repre-
sent the law of Moslem countries. 203 This view was confirmed in the 
ARAMCO Award, which stated that Islamic law is one of the great 
legal systems of the world. 204 Where the appropriate legal system 
may appear to be inadequate to give full effect to the rights and 
obligations of the parties, the recognized national and international 
decisionmakers should be able to supplement, but not supplant, it 
with ideas from general jurisprudence and practices, customs, and 
usages of the particular natural resources industry. This process of 
enrichment, or what has been called "juristic chemistry,"205 is the 
means of natural growth for all legal systems. The municipal laws 
of other states as well as international law, including the general 
principles of law universally recognized, form the sources from 
which ideas can be borrowed to enhance the legal systems of devel-
oping countries needing such enhancement. 
203. Petroleum Dev. [Trucial Coast] Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (1951). 
204. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117, 162 (1958). 
205. See R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 94-96 (1938) . 
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